Muslim Brotherhood in
power: Can they speak in Islam's name?
H.A. Hellyer , Sunday 11 Nov 2012
For Egyptians President Morsi's failure or success will be his
own, not Islam's. Egypt saw a number of revolutions in the 20th century, it may
well see another one in the 21st
With
the ascension of the Islamist movement of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) to the
Egyptian presidency, many considered this as a historic occasion: one that signified
the next great step for Islam and democracy. Others, however, questioned
whether such an assessment was useful, or if it hindered our comprehension of
the relationship between religion, identity politics and the Egyptian public
sphere.
It
is difficult to identity what is considered to be ‘Islam’ in the context of
contemporary Egypt. Within the modern academic domain of Islamic studies, the
concept of a normative ‘Islam’ is subjected to the post-modern critique – on
what basis is anything described as normative? Why is this ‘Islam’ more
‘Islamic’ than that ‘Islam’? Who has the authority to insist their reading of
religion is more authentic or justifiable than someone else’s?
Historically,
religious authority in Muslim communities was derived from a combination of
popular consent, as well as continuity. In Egypt, an institution emerged with
both - the Azhar. Not the university particularly, which is a modern
institution, but the Azhar Mosque itself, which produced scores of religious
scholars that were considered as authoritative reference points for Sunni
Muslims. The Azhar’s approach to religion, described as the ‘Azhari minhaj’,
remains the technical basis of the Azhar University’s creed: ecumenical upon
matters of law according to the extant schools of jurisprudence, classical
Sunni theology, and the different Sufi orders. It’s inspired and linked to
other approaches represented in other countries – the Tabah Foundation in Abu
Dhabi, for example, or the plethora of institutions worldwide that seek it’s
authentication.
Beyond
its historical continuity, the Azhar has popular consent – 95% of all Egyptians
express confidence in the Azhar, according to Gallup polls
[http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/02/the_battle_for_the_azhar ].
Internationally, it is also recognised as unique, in that it has the pedigree
of being, as the Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
put it to me, ‘ the only Islamic institution that has kept a continuous
chain of education for more than 10 centuries.’
The
MB is a recent, modern political movement, which distinguishes it from the
Azhar as a religious institution. However, it is more than that – it is the
politicisation of not the historic religious approach of the Azhar, but of
another religious approach. The contemporary MB is divided along several
different religious interpretations, but the core of the MB is a religious
approach that is invariably described as ‘reformist Salafism’, ‘modernism’ or
simply, ‘Brotherhood-like’ (ikhwani). On issues of law, theology and
spirituality, it differs with the more historical Azhari heritage in a number
of different ways, in pursuit of, as the MB sees it, a reformed, modern
approach to religion. Within the Egyptian religious establishment, this type of
approach is identifiable and well-known. While not viewed with the same
distaste and aversion which is reserved for the purist Salafism of the likes of
the Nour Party and the wide ‘Salafi movement’, it remains an approach of
suspicion owing to what the scholastic authorities of the ‘Azhari approach’
consider to be academic weaknesses within the ‘Brotherhood’ methodological
approach to religion.
This
is separate and additional to the scholastic Azhari opposition to the political
instrumentalisation of religion that the MB engages in. Some intellectuals and
scholars of that approach posit that there are two problems with the ‘Islamic
state’ that the MB advocates: the first has to do with the ‘Islamic’ part, in
terms of the religious approach. But the second problem, in their view, has to
do with the ‘state’ argument, in that contemporary notions of statehood and
government are not easily grafted onto Muslim ethics of governance. (Pre-modern
Muslim government, for example, was typically small, and often libertarian,
relying on a large space accorded to civil society to fulfil welfare needs and
provisions.)
What
the Azhari approach to politics would be is something of a mystery, in that the
Azhar’s scholars have typically preferred to play the part of the public’s conscience,
rather than the public’s chastisers or activists. There have been exceptions to
that rule, in positive and negative ways – the Azhar has, particularly in the
modern period, been less independent from the ruler of the age, and had it’s
credibility damaged as a result. One wonders if in post January 25 Egypt, amid
calls for the Azhar’s independence to be restored, this might change.
That
sort of tension outlined above with the religious establishment goes someway in
understanding the ‘religious engineering’, for lack of a better phrase, that
the MB has attempted to engage in while holding the levers of political power
within Egypt.
[http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/02/the_battle_for_the_azhar ].
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the MB and other Islamist movements
in Egypt, such as the purist Salafi movement, seek to implant other religious
approaches as a new Islamic orthodoxy in Egypt – starting with the Minister of
Endowments, continuing with the position of the Mufti, and ending with the head
of the Azhar University.
With
the rise of the MB to power through democratic means, and the success of its
political party, the Freedom & Justice Party (FJP) in gaining a plurality
of seats in the parliamentary elections, the message, it seemed, was clear.
There were a myriad of responses from within capitals around the world – inside
Muslim communities, and outside of them. There were those, for example, who
echoed the regime of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak: that the
engagement of the MB with the political sphere would be a catastrophic event
that must be prevented at all costs. Such figures found space within Western
capitals, as well as within parts of the Egyptian intelligentsia – their
reaction to Mr Morsi’s narrow victory against Ahmad Shafiq in the presidential
elections was one of horror.
There
was a mosaic of observers who, however, expressed support for the victory of
Morsi over Shafiq. Some did so out of ideological support or sympathy for the
MB – others out of antipathy to Mr Shafiq, who represented a return to the
former regime, as Mr Mubarak’s last prime minister. There were some, however,
who considered a wider question: that the political advancement of the MB in
general, including Mr Morsi’s presidency, represented an advancement of the
relationship between Islam and democracy. The beneficiaries of such
advancements would not be Egyptian alone, but the entire Muslim
world.
The
logic of such a sentiment was not typically found within Egypt, with the
exception of MB supporters, and even then, not all of them. The reason for this
is fairly simple: in order to advocate such a position, ‘Islam’ would need to
be equivocated with, in varying degrees, Mr Morsi, the FJP and the MB. Such
equivalence is difficult to assume when Egyptians, 85%-90% are Muslim, in the
presidential election voted overwhelmingly for candidates other than Mr Morsi.
One
of those candidates was Hamdeen Sabahi. Over the course of the election, one of
his campaign’s favourite slogans was: “No to remnants [of the former regime];
No to traders of religion”. An overwhelming majority of Mr Sabahi’s supporters
were, of course, Muslim - but they did not perceive that their religion obliged
them to support Mr Morsi. On the contrary, they viewed Mr Morsi and his MB
movement to be ‘traders of religion’ – i.e., partisans who instrumentalised
religion for political gain.
With
all the above in mind, it is difficult to argue conclusively that the MB
represents ‘Islam’, or has the most popular claim to represent a normative and
historical understanding of Islam in the context of modern Egypt. Would, then,
it be possible to declare that the MB represents ‘Islamism’ (i.e., the modern
political ideology), and that this latest period thus represents a great step
for ‘Islamism and Democracy’?
Such
a statement might be more credible, but it presents a fairly Arab-centric view
of what ‘Islamism’ actually is. As noted above, the MB’s political ideology is
rooted in a particular religious approach – while other Islamists might reject
that approach entirely. The Islamists of Turkey, for example, represented in
the current AKP government, do not ascribe the MB’s Islamism. Turkish Islamists
are vehemently opposed to the purist Salafi movement, in a way that the MB is
not – to the point that Turkish Islamists are currently expending vast amounts
of funds for the upkeep of Sufi mausoleums within the Arab world, which purist
Salafis would prefer to dismantle and destroy. The intellectual heritage of
Turkish Islamism also differs from that of MB Islamism, quite substantially.
Perhaps,
then, one might speak of Morsi’s presidency as the next ‘great step’ for MB
Islamism and democracy? Perhaps, indeed. After all, the Egyptian MB is the
progenitor of many other Islamist movements in the region, and indeed
worldwide. If the Egyptian MB can succeed in producing a government that
genuinely provides good policies for all Egyptians, and does not increase
religious-based identity politics (especially damaging in a country with a
large non-Muslim minority), then that might have wide-scale repercussions
elsewhere.
Many
Egyptian observers who remain sceptical of Mr Morsi still hope he will be
successful in taking Egypt to a more positive and progressive stage of its
political transition. For them, however, his failure or success will be his
own, rather than Islam’s. Those of us outside of Egypt are, in the main,
waiting to see what will happen next – and to see if, indeed, Egypt’s next
great step will be a positive one, or a negative one for future generations to
correct. After all, there was one more than one revolution in the Egypt of the
20th century – there may well be another in the 21st.
Dr H.A. Hellyer is a nonresident fellow at the Brookings
Institution and the Institute of Social Policy and Understanding ( @hahellyer
).
·
Keunikan Mesir hal ehwal Islam didominasi
oleh al-Azhar atau lepasan penuntut al-Azhar yang bertebaran dipelosok Mesir.
Mereka berada dipelbagai tempat dan agensi dalam negara Mesir. Mesir juga
mempunyai pelbagai aliran seperti Sufi/tarekat, salafi wahabi, liberal, dan
gerakan islam ikhwan muslimin dll. Manhaj al-Azhar adalah akidah ASWJ, Fiqh 4
mazhab dan tarikat tasawuf. Majoroiti muslim di mesir berpegang dengan manhaj
tersebut (manhaj al-azhar). Manakala gerakan islam bercampur dari sudut fahaman
umpamanya ikhwan muslimin didominasi gln islamis tapi tidak jelas dari sudut
akidah, sebahagian adalah salafi wahabi. Pimpinan baru mesir yg diwakili ikhwan
muslimin adalah pelbagai ltarblkg fahaman islam sama ada ASWJ, wahabi dll.
Bahkan golongan wahabi membentuk parti an-nour dan mereka bersama pakatan
ikhwan muslimin skrg. Suara mereka harus didengari presiden mesir atas prinsip
demokrasi. Manhaj al-azhar yg juga sama
dengan manhaj gln tarikat sufi mesir adlah golongan dikatakan ramai bahkan
majoriti walaupun bersifat nonpartisan atau tidak berpolitik wajar diambil
perhatian presiden dalam agenda islam dan watan. Perbezaan manhaj al-azhar dan
gerakan islam ikhwan muslimn dalam pendekatan islam adalah jelas dan nampak
berbeza walaupun sama2 inginkan islam sebagai ad-din. Institusi al-azhar masih
dominan dan mempunyai autoriti dan pengaruhnya tersendiri bahkan diiktiraf
institusi sunni terbesar di dunia. Dalam hal ini presiden dalam dilema antara
golongan partisan menyokongnya dan golongan sebahagian besar al-azhari dan sufi
yang nonpartisan tapi mempunyai suaranya tersendiri. Kebijaksanaan dan
pendekatan koleftif tuan presiden adalah penting…konsep ‘ulil amri’…pandangan
al-azhar khususnya majlis a’la al-azhar dan majlis a’la sufiah perlu dijadikan
rujukan dan penasihat tak rasmi dalam hal ehwal islam dan watan mesir….semoga
mesir akan terus bangkit memperjuangkan ummah dan sebagai paksi manhaj
ASWJ…ketahuilah mesir ardu kinanah, byk rahsia kebangkitan islam
disana…wallahua;lam.
