Sufism and Modernity: A Comparative Study of Contemporary Social
Movements In Turkey, Syria and Egypt
Abstract
During the 20th century,
a combination of the unprecedented challenges- secularized authoritarian state
structures, a Western-inspired rationalist discourse and Islamic fundamentalist
critique since the second half of the 19th century-
led to a decline in traditional forms of Sufism. Sufi orders needed to adapt
their traditions to the new circumstances, otherwise they would become
moribund. Some Sufi orders transformed into new forms of collective action
such as cultural and educational associations, social movements and political
parties. At the same time, they developed strategies to face the challenges of
modernity which normally involved collaboration with one of the dominant forces
of the age: the nation state and its elitist class, Islamic modernism and
fundamentalism, Western culture and globalization. The most prominent social
movements today are those which have been able to collaborate with contemporary
forces and to adapt to a changing environment. The transformation of Sufism as
reflected in the Gülen Movement in Turkey, the Kuftariyya Order in Syria
and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt reflects the changes in various
aspects of spiritual and activist Sufi tradition in a modern context.
Introduction
Early
20th century scholarship directed towards the study of Sufism, focused
mainly on its mystical and non-political aspects. Most Orientalist scholarship
treated Sufism as a medieval concept of mystical beliefs or a philosophy that
has little to do with the Islamic faith.[1] Orientalist scholarship also
ignored Sufism’s role in politics as well as its social and economic
manifestations as expressed in Sufi orders.[2] Furthermore, because Sufism is
characteristically linked with traditional Islamic societies, many Orientalists
assumed that modernity would eliminate Sufism.[3] More recent studies however,
have tried to correct the picture and investigate modern forms and
manifestations of Sufism. This research is founded on a project that was
initiated by Carl Ernst who explains that “while the study of historical Sufism
is essential, it needs to be juxtaposed with the exploration of Sufism’s
current manifestations to reveal its contemporary significance”.[4] Today, Sufism is no longer
exclusively confined within an organized Sufi order; instead it has become a
significant aspect within many modern social movements. Therefore, unlike most
of the earlier surveys of Sufism, this research does not primarily treat Sufism
as a traditional phenomenon of the past. Instead, we will focus on contemporary
manifestations of Sufism. This research will investigate the effect of
modernity to illustrate that Sufism in our contemporary world, has not only a
spiritual, but a social, economic, and most importantly a political dimension
as well.
At the same time, the role of
traditional Sufism in several movements and trends within the Islamic world has
been commonly underestimated. Traditional Sufism acted as a
conservative force to maintain an authentic Islam; it opposed European imperial
expansion during the 19th century; and it acted as a
moderating force for the foundation of popular support for 20thcentury political Islam.[5] However, the study of Islamic movements within the
socio-political context of the 19th and 20thcenturies’
reformist movement, has produced scholarship that categorizes Islamic movements
as either Sufi of a non-political nature or as socio-political movements of a
fundamentalist, non-mystical nature. Hence, social movements in the Islamic
world are either Sufi/mystical or socio-political, but never both. This gap in
scholarship has created a dichotomy since the overlap of these two categories
has been ignored. Therefore, scholarship continues to produce an inaccurate
image of Islamic social movements.
The aim of this research is to address this
dichotomy by exploring the relationship between mystical Sufism and political
social movements. This overlap is exemplified in three social movements: the
Gülen Movement in Turkey, the Kuftariyya Order in Syria and the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt. These three contemporary Islamic social
movements have adopted different aspects of Sufism within their organization,
practice and their method of interaction with their surrounding social and
political contexts. In this research, we will pin down the elements of Sufism
in each of the social movements and compare and contrast them to one another.
We will also attempt to understand the characteristics of each type of Sufism
and the way these characteristics relate to the traditional expressions of
Sufism. Finally, we will illustrate how modern factors influenced and shaped
these Sufi elements within the modern context. At the same time, this
illustration will reflect the Sufi elements’ level of centrality in advancing
the social mobility of each social movement.
To carry out this task, it is essential
to study traditional Sufism in order to understand the components of its modern
manifestations. Thus, this research will start with an analysis of 19th century Sufi orders in the
areas under study. Our main references to traditional Sufism are the Naqshbandiyya
and the Shadhiliyya Orders. The Naqshbandiyya is among the most influential and
widely-based orders in 19th century Turkey and Syria. The
Shadhiliyya held the same significance in 19th century Egypt.
Before starting the analysis of our historical
context, there are a few points concerning terminology which need to be
clarified for further reference throughout this research. The term social
movement within the context of this research refers to “organized contentions structured
through mechanisms of mobilization that provide strategic resources for
sustained collective action”.[6] For the most part, the study of
Islamic social and political movements has focused on analyzing the ideology,
structure, history and goals of Islamic actors.[7] Only recently has their study
been incorporated within the Social Movement Theory Approach (SMT), which
places Islamic movements within a plethora of theoretical and conceptual
developments on social movements.[8] According to the SMT approach,
our movements are regarded as rational, organized manifestations of collective
action and not as irrational outbursts intended to alleviate psychological
strains.[9] Religion, as only one of
several dimensions of Islamic movements, will be regarded as an organizational
resource and as a source of the mobilizing ideology.
It must also be noted that formal
social movements are not the only pattern of organization. Recent studies show
that informal networks of politicized participants create ‘social movement
communities’ which promote the goals of a social movement outside the
boundaries of a formal organization.[10] Informal social networking is a
subtler form of collective action in less open political systems where formal
organization risks regime reprisal.[11] Since Turkey, Syria and Egypt
each represent varying degrees of repressive political systems, our analysis
will reflect forms of informal networking in each social movement.
Chapter 1: Traditional Sufism
From the time of the Prophet, there
were persons who paid attention to their souls; they tried to harmonize their
internal experiences with the external observances of their faith by means of
renunciation of the world and asceticism.[12] From the 2nd/8th century what became known as a
Sufi renounced the world, devoted himself to the service of God and aimed at
doing away with the impulses of the self through self-training and
exercise.[13] Sufism was merely a philosophy adopted by individuals but it
had no organized form yet. The ṭarīqa which branches off from another
path, that of the law – shari‘a, refers to the Sufi quest to realize the
Divine or truth (ḥaqiqa). The focus of this research is on
orders which emphasize that the follower (murid), must adhere to the injunctions of
the shari‘a since the inner relationship between the shari’a, ṭarīqa, and ḥaqiqa cannot be ignored. For them,
“the ṭarīqa and shari‘a necessitate
each other, since the path to God consists of an external aspect and an
internal aspect. Its externality is the shari’a and the ṭarīqa and its internality is
the ḥaqiqa; the aim of the three is to fulfil
the servitude of God”.[14] Sufis distinguish themselves by their
interpretation of the Qur’an through ta’wil, an effort to reveal the inner
(esoteric) dimensions of spiritual life and their challenge of the rigid,
formal interpretations of Islam.[15]
During post-classical Sufism dated
from 5th-6th/11th-12th centuries, mystic life was
increasingly cultivated in orders. In the 10th and 11th centuries, the small, private
groups of spiritual masters turned into more formal associations; each
brotherhood elaborated distinct spiritual methods and disciplinary practices in
lodges (zāwiya). The Sufi lodges developed a multiplicity
of spheres and activities; they were at once schools, commercial and social
focal points, law courts, banks, storehouses, poor houses, burial grounds and
the source and channel for connection with the Divine.[16] The term ṭarīqa extended from the inner
spiritual path to include an externalized, institutionalized and popularized
socio-religious organization.[17] Therefore, the Islamic term denoting a
Sufi order united under a master is ṭarīqa.[18] The shaykh is thought to
be connected by a chain of grace, blessing, or blood to a founding
saint[19] and the order’s affiliation (silsila) is traced back from the present
shaykh to the time of the Prophet Muhammad.[20]
By the end of the 18th century, innovations had become
fully integrated and the spirit and aims of the different orders had become
stereotypical of one another.[21] The main attributes of 18th century Sufi orders remained
for the most part, reflective of traditional Sufism in the subsequent centuries.
The main features of Sufi orders came to include a developed hierarchical
organization of a generally uniform character, an initiatory principle for
adherents to join the organization, veneration for the shaykh/murshid of the ṭarīqa and utter subjection to his
authority.[22] The murshid typically led his followers
towards emulating the Prophetic way of life, both outwardly and inwardly. The
spiritual aspirant (murid) was directed by the shaykh through
different stages (maqamat) on the journey to God.[23] The
main instrument for advancement on the mystical path is dhikr – the constant recollection of
God –along with adhering to certain protocols (adāb) such as avoiding deceit and pride.[24] The disciplinary principles may
have also included solitude, vigils, fasting and collective dhikr in coordination with musical
rhythm, breath-control and physical exercises. The association of a saint (wālī), dead or alive, with the qualities
and properties embraced by the termskarama (miracles/grace acts) and baraka (spiritual power) were also
important features.
At the same time however, shaykhs
began to vie with one another to demonstrate their loyalty and subservience to
the shari‘a.[25] This change was partly due
to the rising conflict between exoteric and esoteric doctrines of Islam which
set the stage for the 19th century revivalist Sufi
movements across the Islamic world. Advocating
adherence to ‘ilm (knowledge) and taṣawwuf(Sufism)
and strict observance of the shari‘a and sunna, became a strong trend
among Sufi orders. Although not all orders (ṭuruq)adopt
this principle, the ṭuruq and
the social movements in our study relate in varying degrees to this trend. This
research does not assume that there is a single form of ‘authentic’ Sufism.
Hence, we will not attempt to discern or evaluate whether or not this trend is
orthodox Sufism or true as related to the Islamic faith and the forefathers of
Sufism. The reality of Sufi orders’ social, political, economic and spiritual
roles as we mentioned earlier, makes it apparent that Sufism entails a variety
of religious groupings, meanings and social, economic and political functions
that have varied from place to another. Since a Sufi order is not a
sociological classification that defines certain characteristics or a distinct
social entity, it would therefore be inaccurate to limit the meaning of Sufism
within a specific definition. Therefore, our analysis of the Naqshbandiyya and
Shadhiliyya as forms of traditional Sufism is not an attempt to create a single
characterization of ‘traditional’ Sufism during the 19th century.
It is merely to illustrate one form of traditional Sufism to use as reference.
The Naqshbandiyya
The Naqshbandiyya was introduced in
western Asia during the process of Ottoman state building and the search for an
orthodox alternative to the unruly dervish fraternities.[26] During the 17th and 18th centuries the Mujaddidi
tradition (an offshoot of the original Naqshbandiyya) was transmitted and
institutionalized in Damascus and Istanbul.[27] The impact of the
Mujaddidiyya in Istanbul peaked in the second half of the 18th century when its leaders became
involved in the reform politics of the Ottoman Empire.[28] Shaykh Diya’
al-Din Khalid, who had been initiated into the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in
India, founded in the 1820s the Khalidiyya offshoot.[29] In the 19th century, the Naqshbandiyya
offshoots developed strategies to cope with new realities of modernity: the
impact of the West, the spread of rationalist thought, the consolidation of
colonial rule and subsequent authoritarian states, and the rise of Islamic
modernism and fundamentalism.[30]
The Khalidiyya brotherhood was
committed to two foundations: its socio-political activism and commitment to
orthodoxy by ensuring the subservience of the highly mystical path of the ṭarīqa to the shari‘a and the Prophet’s
sunna.[31] These aims as fundamental principles of the movement are a
clear adaptation to the environment. The brotherhood had to strike a balance
between its emphatic orthodox outlook and to its activist legacy. The
Naqshbandiyya and its offshoots in Istanbul and Damascus joined a
modernist-fundamentalist camp which moved towards imagining Islam in light of
modern ideals. The modernist side emphasized Western ideas and values while the
fundamentalist aspect sought to ground these borrowings in the Muslim
faith.[32]
Expansion: Collaboration with the State
and the People
Sufism changed since its introduction
as a strictly ascetic doctrine some three hundred years after the death of the
Prophet.[33] The
Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi-Khalidi order became characterized by familial succession,
incorporation of the saints’ descendents into imperial and local elites and
cooperation with the original Naqshbandiyya.[34] The Khalidi branch expanded quickly and
penetrated the Ottoman state due to its religious orthodoxy and political
activism. During the rule of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1837), Shaykh Khalid
recruited ‘ulama’ and high-ranking bureaucrats as means to promote the
spiritual rebirth of the Muslim community and to strengthen its resistance to
external attack. In 1826, the Khalidiyya encouraged
the ‘ulama’ and senior bureaucracy to approve the elimination of the moribund
Janissary corps which stood in the way of Ottoman modernization.[35] In
turn, the Ottoman Empire gave the Khalidiyya independence and space to spread
their spiritual teachings, as opposed to its abolishment of the heterodox
Bektashi brotherhood.[36] These changes lead to a general mood of
orthodoxy that prevailed among the elite of Istanbul. Until the downfall of Ottoman Empire in 1909, the Khalidiyya became the most
influential order.[37]
Not only did the Khalidiyya find its
greatest adherents in learned individuals, merchants, bureaucrats, and
notables, but it also managed to become a grassroots, activist movement.
Khalidiyya leaders during the 19th century, focused on training
deputies and ordering them to initiate their own lodges.[38] Furthermore, the Khalidiyya
offered leadership and an organizational vehicle for political independence and
economic revival at a time where the Muslim population suffered great economic
and political weakness.[39] To compete with modern ideas
and capitalism, the order offered its own competing network of economic and
political success based on Islamic tradition. With Western principles of
capitalism and globalization threatening people’s traditional ways of living,
the Khalidiyya focused on studying the life of the Prophet to make abstract
Islamic concepts more concrete. The Khalidiyya stressed the importance of
direct engagement with politics and social life in the example of the Prophet
as a successful social engineer and political leader.[40] The Khalidi branch of the 19th century became a vehicle for
the preservation of Islam and a mass mobilization force against the penetration
of capitalism and modern institutions that unsettled the traditional community.[41]
Mysticism, Reform and the Salafi Influence
Shaykh Khalid paid special attention
to the organizational dimension of his order; his innovations were designed to
turn the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya-Khalidiyya into an effective
socio-religious movement in the service of an orthodox Muslim community.[42] Three
organizational innovations of Khalid included the khalwa -where he referred initial
instruction of disciples to his deputies who would give them concentrated
training for forty days, the rabita - which replaced accompaniment
by instructing his disciples to concentrate in their imagination on his figure,
and ghalq al-bab – a practise translated into
‘closing the door’ to non-members during dhikr sessions which gave the ṭarīqa the character of an exclusive social
movement.[43] However, although innovations within the mystical sphere
remained a vibrant aspect of the Naqshbandiyya offshoots, the Naqshbandiyya had
an early contribution to the formation of the Islamic reformist
trend. Sufi reformist movements were a significant aspect of the greater
18thand 19th centuries’ revivalist
movements.
Since the 17th century, Naqshbandi masters
started a movement against what was regarded as deviations from the path of the
Qur’an and the Prophet’s sunna. The Naqshbandi tradition is
characterized by a constant modification and reinterpretation of its principles
and practices according to changing circumstances and personal preferences of
its leaders.[44] As
the Wahhabi movement intensified its fight against Sufism, a revival movement
within the orders was also taking place.[45] The Naqshbandiyya was among the
most notable orders in this movement; it articulated criticism of unorthodox
practices associated with popular Sufism.[46] Deviation from the shari’a
was seen as one of the reasons behind the defeat and degeneration of the
Ottoman Empire. They responded to the challenge presented by seeking to
preserve the inner (bātinī) aspect of Islam along with full
acceptance of the outward (ẓāhirī) aspect and condemned the
accretions which had debased the orders.
Many Naqshbandi traditions were
already aligned with the principles of the Sufi reform movement. In fact, the
leaders of this movement were committed to the Naqshbandi tradition as they
drew their inspiration from the orthodox thrust of the Naqshbandiyya and its
abhorrence of practices transgressing the shari‘a. The Naqshbandiyya
reform was also characterized by an emphasis on the study of hadith, a shift
from the pantheistic interpretation of Ibn ‘Arabi’s[47] teachings to an
interest in the transcendental approach of al-Ghazzali,[48] stricter
compliance with the precepts of the shari’a, greater involvement in politics
and society and consolidation of the structural organization of the orders.[49] Silent dhikr, which was generally recognized as the
mainstay of the Naqshbandi tradition was sometimes accompanied by vocal forms
of recollection.[50] Hence,
popular Sufi practices like music and dance during dhikr was a
target for elimination by the revivalist Sufi movement and the
Naqshbandiyya.[51] Other targets of the revivalist movement such as the
elimination of all of Ibn ‘Arabi’s teachings and the prohibition of tomb
visits, were however inconsistent with the Naqshbandiyya which still maintained
such practices.
After the death of Khalid in 1827,
‘Isa al-Kurdi took leadership of the Khalidiyya in Damascus, while Gümüşhanevi
became his contemporary in Istanbul.[52] With the ascendance of these two
adepts to the Khalidiyya, a split occurs in the development of Sufism in Syria
and Turkey. Gümüşhanevi’s acceptance of Ibn ‘Arabi’s doctrine of waḥdat al-wujud and his authorization of vocaldhikr, brought the Khalidiyya in Istanbul
closer to popular Sufism. On the other hand, while ‘Isa appreciated the
mystical writings of Gümüşhanevi, he clung to the Naqshbandi stress on shari‘a
and denounced Sufi practices that contravened it. He was not extremely
subservient to the emergent Salafi trend however; he still approved visiting
saints’ and tombs.[53] At that time, the Khalidiyya in Syria began to
move away from the Naqshbandi tradition of focusing its efforts on the
community’s elite and upper-class. Instead, ‘Isa required his deputies to
conceal their path from outsiders, to keep a close connection between them, and
to centre their efforts on the urban lower class and countryside.[54] This
conservative populism paved the way for the transformation of the Khalidiyya
into its contemporary Kuftariyya offshoot which we will discuss later.
The Shadhiliyya
The Shadhiliyya which goes back a long a way in Egyptian history, was founded
in the 13th century by Abu al-Hassan
al-Shadhili (d. 1258). His teachings spread extensively and they acquired the
allegiance of several illustrious spiritual masters including Abu al-Abbas
al-Mursi (d. 1286) and the Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah (d. 1309) who established the actual
order during the 14thcentury.[55] The Shadhiliyya also gave birth
to two significant ṭarīqa founders Ahmad al-Badawi and Ibrahim
ad-Dasuqi, whose orders still survive today.[56]
Although al-Shadhili was known
within the order as the greatest saint, his spiritual status acquired through
the execution of miracles, was not the reason behind the large following of
this order. Instead, it was partly the conservative image and the literary body
provided by Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah that this order enjoyed the allegiance of a large
number of adherents, especially during Medieval Egypt.[57] The Shadhiliyya is seen as
conservative by nature; its founder excluded both antinomian behaviour and
excessive devotion. Early before the 19th century, the Shadhiliyya had
branched into many sub-orders that ranged from orthodoxy to pantheism.[58] For example, the Hasafiyya
Shadhiliyya, which we will elaborate on in the final chapter of this research,
is an example of an orthodox Shadhili branch, as defined by contemporary Muslim
scholars. Other branches however, such as the contemporary Hamidiyya
Shadhiliyya (formally recognized in 1926),[59] were not as conservative as
their ancestor. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, we will focus on
the general environment of the Sufi orders in Egypt, to which the Shadhiliyya
belonged. At the same time, we will also reflect specific dimensions of the
Shadhiliyya branches to give deeper insight into this specific order.
Relations with the State
Sufi orders in Egypt during the Ottoman Empire and the British occupation were
greatly influenced by their relations with the state. In 1812, a firmān (document) generated by
Muhammad ‘Ali, granted shaykh al-sajjāda al-Bakriyya authority over Sufi orders. In accordance to this document, the
successive heads of the Bakriyya confirmed into office, heads of some Sufi
orders which implied their official recognition.[60] Official recognition was
withheld from others. To be recognized as a legal ṭarīqa, brotherhoods needed to have a clear
internal structure, headed by the shaykh al-sajjāda, literally ‘shaykh of the prayer rug’;
the prayer rug being a symbol of his authority and also an actual rug inherited
from his predecessors.[61] Through the firmān, Muhammad ‘Ali undermined the position
of powerful shaykhs by giving sole authorization to shaykh al-sajjāda al-Bakriyya. In return, shaykh al-sajjāda al-Bakriyya ensured that officially
recognized orders remained loyal to the Khedive.
Ali al-Bakri (d. 1880), shaykh al-sajjāda al-Bakriyya, created an umbrella position
for himself, under which he protected the officially recognized Sufi orders
from interference in their affairs. This set up served the interests of the
different orders’ shaykhs as it maintained their autonomy and the credibility
of their positions as heads of the orders. Sufi orders felt protected by shaykh mashayikh al-ṭuruq al-ṣufiyya (a term developed after 1880 to
refer to the head of the Sufi orders). The shaykhs of the official orders thus
followed in the footsteps of their protector and kept loyal to the Khedive. For
a time, the Shadhiliyya was not incorporated into this system as the supreme
head of Shadhiliyya in Egypt, Muhammad al-Jawahri already had his base of
authority and so he abstained from involvement in the emerging ṭuruq administration.[62] However, with the death of
al-Jawahri (sometime between 1856-1870), the central authority of the
Shadhiliyya came to an end and by 1906 many branches of the Shadhiliyya
eventually came under the same umbrella of the official ṭuruq.[63] The bisection between the
officially recognized orders and the orders lacking this recognition had
powerful implications over the political role of the Sufi orders in Egypt.
This set up paved the way for the
general passivity and political aloofness of Sufi orders in Egypt. During the
‘Urabi insurrection[64] against the British occupation,
the officially recognized Sufi orders upheld an attitude of aloofness, staying
loyal to the Khedive despite his acceptance of British occupation.[65] It is interesting to note that
the Sufi orders which did play political roles in the period preceding and
during the insurrection were heads of orders with non-official status;
consequently, two of them were sub-branches of the Shadhiliyya.[66] Hence, although most Sufi
orders had adopted a trend of political aloofness, there remained a few which
maintained an activist attitude within their ideology.
Furthermore, the Regulations for Sufi
orders implemented by the British from 1895 to 1905 contained a guarantee of
immunity from supervision by or incorporation into other institutions.[67] These changes shielded the
orders from the wider society and made them inaccessible to efforts to mobilize
them (such as the Muslim Brotherhood) and protection from outside attacks on
Sufism (the Wahabiyya had founded a formal organization, al-Jam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya in 1913).[68] Hence, most Sufi orders in
Egypt became characteristically apolitical and subservient to the state. They
were seen as more keen on protecting their own survival rather than getting
involved in the wider reformist and revival movement that had become widespread
across the Muslim world.
Mysticism
The ‘ulama’ had become deeply involved
in ṭuruq affairs at a time when the influence of ‘ilm and taṣawwuf was great; many heads of ṭuruq were ‘ulama’ and even Azhar-based.[69] Two prominent shaykhs of
al-Shadhiliyya during the 18th century, Ahmad al-Jawahri and
his son Muhammad Abu al-Hadi were also lecturers at al-Azhar.[70] ‘Ulama’-influenced ṭuruq condemned certain practices and beliefs
considered characteristic of popular ṭuruq. One of the most significant
implications caused by the creation ofshaykh al-sajjāda al-Bakriyya was the beginning of a deep
divide between ‘ilm and taṣawwuf. By investing al-Bakri with exclusive
authority over the ṭuruq and ṭuruq-linked institutions, he limited the
influence of the ‘ulama’ which contributed to an increase in antinomian beliefs
and practices in popular Egyptian Sufi orders.[71]
Regulations for ṭuruq in Egypt promulgated by khedival decree
and amended in 1903 and 1910 (which were supplemented by the internal
regulations of 1905), included a number of paragraphs which eliminated the use
of musical instruments, dancing and the eating of fire and glass during dhikr session.[72] Although such proclamations
should have contributed to the spread of orthodox Sufism in Egypt, these
paragraphs were few and were not enforced.[73] The paragraphs seem to have been
a superficial response to the demands of Muhammad Rashid Rida[74] and Muhammad ‘Abduh, two main
figures of Salafiyya in Egypt.[75]Because the proclamations of the
regulations protected the interests of the official orders, the regulations
limited their need for a defensive response to attacks on Sufism.[76] Thus, the Sufi orders were not
forced to adapt their beliefs and practices to accommodate the Salafi trend.
Hence, these regulations not only caused Sufi orders in Egypt to remain passive
to political involvement and activism, but they also shielded them from having
to make their practises and beliefs closer to the orthodoxy advocated by a
reformist Sufi movement and the Salafiyya.
Salafi-perceived antinomian practices
and beliefs such as the mawlid[77] and karama (pl. karamat) remained as two cornerstones of
institutionalized mysticism in the Sufi orders of Egypt.[78] For example, the credibility
and spiritual status of Shaykh Salama Ibn Hassan Salama, the founder of the
Hamidiyya Shadhiliyya came from karamat associated with him.[79] At amawlid, his followers would sing songs while
flicking their fingers and swaying rhythmically in a way typical of Egyptians
listening to popular music.[80] These practices and the popular
conception of baraka[81] are examples of practices and beliefs
regarded as non-adherent to the shari’a and sunna. Thus, the general picture of Sufism in
Egypt during the 19th and 20th centuries as exemplified by the
Hamidiyya Shadhiliyya and other official orders, is a passive, inactive form of
mysticism, which according to the Salafi trend is non-observant of shari‘a and
sunna.
Chapter 2: The
Gülen Movement
In Turkey, the Khalidiyya’s activity
was hampered by the establishment of the Turkish secular state. The ban imposed
on Sufi activity by Ataturk’s regime in 1925 along with intensified persecution
in the aftermath of the Menemen Rebellion of 1930[82], caused the Naqshbandiyya
and its offshoots to go underground. When state inspection relaxed in the
1970s, the Naqshbandiyya resurfaced and developed strategies to face the
challenges posed by modernity and a repressive state. These strategies have
normally involved collaboration with one of the dominant forces of the age: the
nation state and its elitist class, Islamic modernism and fundamentalism,
Western culture and globalization.[83] At the same time, the Naqshbandiyya
offshoots transformed gradually from being strictly religious associations into
various new forms of a religious underpinning.[84] New forms of collective
action included competing educational and cultural associations, social
movements and political parties.[85] Thus, the Naqshbandiyya’s
transformation offered a high degree of social mobility both horizontally due
to its production of society-centric Islamic movements; and vertically with its
state-centric political parties.[86]
Said Nursi (d. 1960), a modernist
adept of the Khalidiyya founded the Nurcu movement which gave birth to his
successor who links closely to his ideology, Fethullah Gülen (b. 1938). Today,
the neo-Nurcu Gülen Movement, founded and lead by Gülen, is the most
outstanding of the Nurcu circles. While modern affiliates of the
Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya-Khalidiyya, most notably Gülen himself, continue to
successfully voice their vision of Islam in the national and global spheres,
they have done so at the price of major modifications to their modes of
operation and their commitment to the orthodoxy of the brotherhood.[87]
Gülen’s Activist Piety
For modern Naqshbandis, to some extent
or other, their mystical path was superseded by the modernist and
fundamentalist readings of Islam. Prominent among those who have adapted their
Sufi ideals to such readings, is the Gülen Movement.[88] Like his predecessor Nursi, Gülen’s
message is designed to substitute the Sufi ṭarīqa mode of religiosity which he
found to be obsolete. He became convinced of the need to enlighten the masses
in the various fields of learning and to demonstrate the truths of religion in
the face of modernity. Gülen links his understanding
of Sufism to the first centuries, during which influential Sufis such as
al-Ghazzali and Rumi[89] practised Sufism without
following a ṭarīqa or a shaykh. Gülen has written
lengthily in the various meanings related to Sufism, on the life of the Prophet
Muhammad and on science and modernity. His writings include a collection of
books and articles that are widely available in several languages including
Turkish, English and Arabic. With an ideology which brings together modern
reasoning and 12th century spirituality, Gülen’s
ideas reflect a unique combination of authenticity and modernity. This trend of
thought has attracted a large number of followers not only in Turkey, but
around the whole world.
At the same time, Gülen has not taken
up modernity without criticism. To Gülen, the spiritual emphasis of Sufism
provides a basis for purifying modern scientific study and its ethical
inadequacies; and so it provides both a scientific and humane, religious
approach to life.[90] Gülen believes that Islam is
the middle way which leads to a critical engagement with modernity. His
interpretation of Islam is a balance between materialism and spiritualism,
rationalism and mysticism, worldliness and excessive asceticism and between
this world and the hereafter.[91] He does so through enriching
his followers with Sufi ideals and meanings to guide their morals. At the same
time, he encourages them to engage with the modern world.
Gülen shares with the Naqshbandi
tradition its commitment to orthodoxy, adherence to the shari‘a and sunna and an emphasis on
the after life which makes his followers’ outlooks on life serious and active.[92] To him taṣawwuf and shari‘a are two aspects of the same
truth and so they cannot be separated. He believes that the sole performance of
the external dimension related to the shari‘a would result in a dry
ritualistic practise whereas concentration on the inner Sufi dimension and rejecting
the prescribed rituals would lead the individual to follow his own whims and
proclivities.[93] Gülen’s preservation of this
fundamental principle is not only a continuation of the Naqshbandi tradition;
it is also a form of adherence to the contemporary fundamentalist
interpretation of Islam. Although the Salafi ideology is not entrenched within
the Turkish community, it has become a widespread inclination in
the Muslim world. Therefore, Gülen’s ideas not only avoid confrontation with the
Salafiyya, but they also have the potential to spread in the Arab world where
the Salafiyya is much more influential. Indeed, Gülen’s books are now
translated into Arabic and are readily available at a bookstore established by
the movement in Cairo.[94]
Since the Naqshbandi tradition is
characterized by ijtihād, Gülen considers his new
and adapted practices and ideas, a renewal of the Islamic tradition within its
contemporary context. Indeed, Gülen’s ideas are specifically inspired by
Ahmad Sirhindi[95] whose writings were concerned
with the renewal of the spiritual teaching of the Naqshbandi tradition by
focusing on the way of the Prophet instead of early Naqshbandi teachers.[96] Although his followers refer to
him as Hoca or Hocaefendi(literally meaning teacher and
traditionally used by Sufis to refer to their master), Gülen denies that he has
this place among his followers and insists that it is out of respect that they
refer to him using this term.[97] Instead of the traditional ṭarīqa system based on a close
relationship between the shaykh and his disciples, Gülen’s movement gathers
around the study of his books, writings, and video-taped vaaz (sermons). He
has appropriated the reading and debating of his writings to replace the guidance
of Sufi masters; reminiscent of a devotional formula, his writings explain to
his followers how they can incorporate Sufi ideals into their daily
lives.[98] Gülen has dedicated a series of sermons to the
discussion of the Prophet Muhammad which are compiled in a series of books
under the title of, Sonsuz Nur (The Eternal Light). This series focuses on the Prophet
as a role model to aid his followers to internalize spiritual meanings by
following the example of the Prophet. At the same time however, his discussion
of the life of the Prophet as a leader and a teacher in his sermons, sets the
stage for the outward, activist aspect of Gülen’s ideology.
The traditional ṭarīqa’s defined path towards salvation
does not exist for Gülen’s followers. Rather than practising prescribed
exercises and prayers, Gülen’s followers see salvation as a result of good
deeds and service to God which must be combined with an internal purification
of oneself.[99] The discussion of internal
purification is a Sufi aspect in Gülen’s thought which is best reflected in his
book, Kalbin Zümrüt Tepeleri (Emerald Hills of the Heart). This book explains key concepts in
the practice of Sufism, by introducing and describing various stages of the
Sufi path. Gülen describes Sufism as the moral dimension to one’s existence
which one must purify through practicing concepts intrinsic to the Sufi
tradition such as tawba (repentance), tafakkur(reflection), khawf (fear) and zuhd (asceticism).[100] While dhikr in
its congregational form as practised by Sufi orders has been abandoned in the
Gülen Movement altogether, Gülen still emphasizes the importance of dhikr for
his followers and they are committed to reading zikirler (a
compilation of dhikr) on a daily basis.[101] Thus, a member of the Gülen Movement is meant to lead a serious
life of high ethical and moral standards and work as hard as he/she can since
other paths towards salvation are uncertain.
Gülen propagates a subtle religiosity
described as active pietism by Özdalga. He calls for individual
responsibility not only related to one’s inner life as a pious person, but also
directed towards the outside.[102] This philosophy creates greater
emphasis on action rather than traditional Sufi emphasis on contemplation and
spirituality which are ‘inactive’. His pietistic activist philosophy also
encourages a critical ‘rejection of the world’ and not a ‘flight from the
world’ characteristic of mystic Sufism.[103]With this rejection of the world
however, Gülen advocates the organization of the society through rational,
structured activities.Although the Naqshbandi tradition may not have directly
articulated an activist dimension within its ideology, it has clearly practised
this concept through continuous engagement in the developments of its surroundings.
Hence, Gülen’s articulation of this dimension seems to be an extension of a
deeply rooted concept within Naqshbandi tradition.
An essential element appropriating the
success of his movement is the collaboration of Gülen’s ideas with modernity
and Western-inspired rationalist culture. He propagates an ideology which
engages critically with modernity and tradition, with science and religion and
with Westernization and Islamic values.[104] Instead of opposing modernity,
Gülen incorporates an emphasis on science and reason as fundamental aspects of
his ideology. Just like his predecessor Nursi,
Gülen’s message which combines faith with science provides his followers with a
doctrine that allows them to be good Muslims as well as followers of the
secular sciences.[105] Several of Gülen’s writings reflect an emphasis on
the significance of knowledge and learning in all of its fields. In his
book, Ölçü veya Yoldaki Işıklar (Pillars or Lights on the
Road), a compilation of his reflections on various concepts, life and society; Gülen
begins with the discussion of the purpose of knowledge and
learning.[106] For Gülen, true knowledge is that which is in coordination
with scientific proofs and information.[107]
Society-Centric Projects
Sufi networks in the
contemporary world are no longer confined to a spiritual practice but they also
constitute powerful transnational economic, political and social entities.[108] While
most Naqshbandi-related groupings transformed themselves from purely religious
networks to informal educational and cultural associations they still remained
within the Naqshbandi tradition. On the other hand, the Nurcu Movement and its
offshoots, most notably the Gülen Movement, transcended it. The movement has been responsible for investing in secular instead
of religious education, for building secular schools instead of mosques, for
encouraging economic enterprises and requiring them to invest in education and
for supporting collective self-criticism and planning for the future.[109] Thus, Gülen and his followers
come across as social activists seeking salvation through good deeds and
ethical conduct.[110] Gülen’s approach and activities
reflect an understanding of Sufism which is capable of assimilating modern
tools and acculturating to differing social, economic and political
environments.
Gülen’s philosophy is congregational
and encourages collective activism through group projects in the community.[111] At the same time, the Gülen
Movement has adopted a gradualist, accommodative approach to establish itself
and expand; it has shifted from the state-centric Naqshbandi tradition to a
society-oriented one. An expanding private economy in Turkey has given the
Gülen Movement the opportunity to practise its philosophy. The
Gülen Movement incorporates an intricate network of businesses which helps it
build a strong educational enterprise with several universities and colleges
and a vast communication empire.[112] The Gülen Movement also operates
private high schools, hospitals and an Islamic banking chain (Bank Asya) which
together creates a strong, reliable social and economic network for the
movement. The movement also provides for its members, opportunities of upward
social mobility; Nurcu/Gülen connections are useful in establishing businesses,
obtaining credit and scholarships from education and political positions.[113] Thus, the incorporation of
powerful businessmen in the movement satisfies different needs of its members.
Gülen projects great keenness on
scientific and educational advancement of his followers. By the year 2000, the
Gülen Movement had actively established 300 hundred schools and seven
universities in over 50 countries.[114] The application of Gülen’s
approach is reflected in the schools built by his movement which provide a
modern, scientific education. Such schools adopt teach Sufi values and ethics
by example of role models, without brainwashing students into following a
specific ideology.[115] Such a practise is closely
related to the Khalidi tradition which focused on the example Prophet to teach
values. At the same time however, these school as well as summer camps which
are regularly set up by the movement, play a vital role in spreading Gülen’s
message and ideas among the youth.
Gülen’s realization of the importance
of print culture and the media is a reflection of his engagement with a
globalizing world. Such engagement has had a vital role in making his group
into a mass religious social movement.[116] Today, Gülen’s followers have
founded a media network; they are the proprietors of the daily newspaper, Zaman, several magazines such as Sızıntı and Yeni Ümit, a radio
channel called Radyo Nur and the television channel
Samanyolu Televizyonu as well as printing houses and publication companies (eg.
Nil Publication).[117] The Gülen Movement also
established the Turkish Teachers’ Foundation which publishes a monthly journal
and two academic journals and organises symposia, panel discussions and
conferences.[118] Such media outlets and academic
activities have been used to spread Gülen’s
ideas on subjects such asacademia, the relationship between religion and
science and the importance of interfaith dialogue.[119]
Among the most central of these ideas
are love, compassion and tolerance to peoples of other religions and the
importance of interfaith dialogue. The Gülen-established Journalists’
and Writers’ Foundation specifically promotes and acts in accordance to this
message.[120] Although
Gülen links the importance of interfaith dialogue to Sufism, the Naqshbandi
tradition has not reflected such a tendency. Gülen’s emphasis on
interfaith dialogue could be considered his ijtihād and renewal of the spiritual
teachings of the faith. Gülen’s engagement with globalization is also apparent
in his substitution of personal contact between master and disciple with
advanced mass means of communication such as the internet. The number of
internet websites that are dedicated to his ideas and writings are extremely
abundant and available in several languages.[121] This has
lead to a transformation in the character of the Gülen Movement from a
traditional Naqshbandi lodge-based, small-sized community, to a textual-based,
global community which has expanded all the way from the Turkic states, to
Europe, America and even the Arab world.
Relationship with the State
Gülen’s relationship with the state
is different to the relationship of the Naqshbandi tradition. Although the
Naqshbandi tradition was founded on cooperation with the state as exemplified
in the previous chapter, many historical occasions of confrontation with the
state, show that the Naqshbandiyya’s cooperation and appropriation of
government support was only to a limit. For example, while the Naqshbandiyya fully supported the Turkish War of
Independence, it protested against the secular transformation of the system by
Mustafa Kemal.[122] Furthermore, the Naqshbandi leaders led popular
anti-reform movements against Westernization including: the Shaykh Said
Rebellion (1925), the Menemen Rebellion (1930), and the Iskilip Rebellion
(1936).[123] Hence, the
Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya, actively modernized and revived their political ideology,
but they were not ready to forgo fundamental principles in order to receive the
support of the state.
Gülen is
critical of this confrontational approach and does not believe that politics is a
vital principle of religion which makes him opposed
to most political Islamic parties.[124] Gülen propagates an ethic of
co-operation and peaceful activism.[125] He takes a low profile vis-à-vis
politics and his approach reflects much greater cooperation with the secular
state. Gülen cooperationwith a secular state is in the form of avoiding
direct engagement with formal politics. His work, as we saw, is centred on
social, cultural and economic spheres outside the bounds of state control. Gülen’s seems to be a pragmatic choice
within an environment which has been hostile enough to totally eliminate his
predecessors. However, Gülen does have influence
over politics through his media outlets, businesses and Islamic banking, and
his educational empire. His activity in the educational and financial sector
brings him into contact with political figures. His schools in Turkic states
make him an unofficial part of the government initiative to expand Turkish
influence in Turkic states.[126] Furthermore, Gülen’s visit to the Vatican
in 1998, where he was received by Pope John Paul II who conveyed his
satisfaction with Gülen’s activism in interfaith dialogue, is an example of
Gülen global significance.[127] Therefore, although Gülen is not directly
involved in politics through a political party for example, his role in the Turkish
society is highly politicized.
Chapter 3: The
Kuftariyya Order
In Syria, the
Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya has played an important role since the rise of the
Ba’th to power in 1964. Ahmad Kuftaru (d. 2004), Grand Mufti of Syria for more
than forty years, founded in the 1970s the Khalidiyya-Kuftariyya, one of the
largest Sufi organizations in Syria. The 19th century Naqshbandiyya advocated
a return to religion as a resolution for the fragmented state of the Ottoman
Empire. Likewise, the Kuftariyya preaches the creation of a truly Islamic
society to resolve the anomalies of the modern world.[128] This order
claims to represent a stable tradition by reinterpreting Islam in a changing
world. The Kuftariyya is an example of an informal social movement within an
authoritarian state. The Sufi-inspired organizational model has no formal
structure and bases its action entirely on spiritual bonds, informal circles
and daily lessons in the mosque.[129] The Kuftariyya has replaced many
traditional Naqshbandi practices with new innovations to collaborate with
Western culture, globalization, a dominating secular state and a strong
opposing Salafi trend in contemporary Syria. Adaptations have also lead to the
transformation of the Kuftariyya into a socio-economic association with
religious and political underpinnings.
The Kuftariyya: The ṭarīqa
While the Kuftariyya’s maintenance of
the ṭarīqa form of organization may make
it seem to be the most adherent of Sufi tradition of our three social
movements, we will realize however that the ṭarīqa formation is relegated a
secondary role within the Kuftariyya. The Kuftariyya is an example of
a centralized Sufi order where the followers are bound to the order and to each
other through their association with the shaykh of the ṭarīqa – now Salah al-Din Kuftaru who
has replaced his father, Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaru, at his death in 2004.[130] The hierarchal relationship
between the master and murid which is pivotal to Naqshbandi
tradition is still a fundamental aspect of the Kuftariyya.[131] Fundamental
Sufi beliefs are still maintained within the Kuftariyya such as the concepts
of baraka and karama which the followers link to the
shaykh of the Kuftariyya, especially its founder Ahmad Kuftaru.[132] Dhikr as a core practise of ritual meditation in Sufism is emphasized within the
Kuftariyya as vital to purifying the heart.[133] Although dhikr is still practised within the
Kuftariyya circles (ḥalaqāt), it is more commonly practised as a
sober religious lesson. Within its spiritual realm, transformations within the
Kuftariyya are mainly an effect of the influence of the Salafiyya, Western
culture and a rationalist discourse.
While some Naqshbandi traditions
remain fundamental to the practices of the Kuftariyya, other Sufi traditions
have been eliminated.[134] The Kuftariyya abandoned the Sufi lodge (zāwiya) and practices its activities in mosques. Also,
the practise ofsuḥba and khalwa where the murshid stays in close companionship of
his disciples has been replaced by religious lectures or preaching directed by
the master at a group of followers. As a spiritual leader, Kuftaru carried out
a dars (sermon) every Friday at his
mosque in the Abu al-Nur complex which we will elaborate on in the following
section. He discussed a variety of subjects including: meanings of Qur’anic
verses, the relationship between religions especially Islam and Christianity
and the attitude Muslims should take towards natural sciences.[135] Friday
is a day when the most important congregational activities take place; the
sermons (now given by two other shaykhs) represent a form of interaction
between the shaykh and his members.[136]Reference to Qur’anic verses and the
discussion of science during the weekly sermons reflected a keenness to
associate the Kuftariyya with the wider Islamic and global community.
The Kuftariyya is committed to the
Naqshbandi tradition of adhering to shari‘a and
sunna; it propagates a learned and discreet form of Sufism based on the Qur’an
and Prophet’s sunna.[137] Adherence to shari‘a and
sunna has protected the Kuftariyya from Salafi attacks. It is also faithful to
the reformist tradition of the Naqshbandiyya; a fundamental principle of the
Kuftariyya lies upon the idea of ijtihād which
translates into interpreting religion according to current times. According to
this principle, the historical persons within the Naqshbandi tradition are
relegated to less influential positions. They become sources of inspiration in
moral and ethical issues, while their interpretations and teachings are not
necessarily followed closely.[138] The practise of renewal of Naqshbandi
teachings, allows the Kuftariyya to potentially interpret religion in a way
that is conformant to any powerful trends, notably the Salafiyya.
The Kuftariyya illustrates a
willingness to adapt to influential Salafi trend. Some adaptations have been
made to its mystic polemic and terminology so as to avoid the possibility of
impending conflicts with the Salafi trend. This is reflected in its use of
Islamic terminology which has become general to the Muslim community, both
Salafi and Sufi. For example, Kuftaru’s sermons revolved around fundamental
Sufi meanings; however he used the word tazkiyya (purification) instead of taṣawwuf. According to Kuftaru the
meaning of tazkiyya[139] is the original term that
refers to what we know as Sufism today.[140] Using an alternative to taṣawwuf is an example of the
acculturation of the Sufi tradition to a fundamentalist Salafi. At
the same time however, the Kuftariyya’s emphasis on textual references and a
mystic reform through ijtihād, is also a reaction to changing
religious sensibilities.[141] The increasingly literate Syrian society
seeks the truth in modern texts and intellectual authority. Because its
mystical dimension is framed by the doctrine of the Koran and shari’a law, the
Kuftariyya has spread Sufism in the urban middle and upper
classes.[142] The Kuftariyya’s adapted mysticism thus reflects a type of
Sufism that has transformed to suit a rationalist culture modern context where
science and reason are the most reliable references for truth and credibility.
In terms of structure, some changes
have also been made to suit modern times. The Kuftariyya is arranged in a
hierarchy of circles (ḥalaqāt) and each circle contains an
internal hierarchy. Higher members in the hierarchy are responsible for
controlling, advising and inspiring the younger members of the
order.[143] In some cases they also act as mediators where conflicts arise
between leaders of the various circles. Although Sufi rituals such as dhikr may still be practised within each
circle, the division of the order into smaller sub-circles is a modern
innovation made to absorb a larger number of followers. The consequence of this
adaptation however is less interaction, within the spiritual sphere, between
the follower and the head of the order. Likewise spiritual interaction with
other members outside of the individual’s circle is only carried out during
sermons at the mosque or few congregational events that may bring the different
circles together.
The fundamental legitimization of an
order in traditional Sufism is maintained through the silsila. Kuftaru showed keenness to appear
committed to this Sufi tradition by linking his branch to the
Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya-Khalidiyya. However, the historiography of the order
is deliberately unclear on the fact that the establishment of the order was
done independently by Kuftaru. This intentional lack of clarity was an attempt
by Kuftaru to give legitimacy to his order by making it appear that there is a
continuous silsila which links his branch to the
Naqshbandiyya.[144] At the same time however, this lack of clarity does
not seem to cause a problem for his followers. Spiritual loyalty to Kuftaru and
the legitimacy of his branch was not justified with thesilsila, but with modern concepts of reason
and education.[145] It was Kuftaru’s discussions and teachings, reflective
of deep knowledge and understanding, which gave him legitimacy in the eyes of
his followers.[146] This not only reflects a transformation in
the principles of legitimacy from traditional methods to more scientific terms,
but it also reflects less emphasis on the accuracy of once vitally significant
issues within Naqshbandi tradition. Even though this lack of clarity in
the silsila may have terminated the
credibility of a shaykh during more historic times, the ambiguity
in Kuftaru’s silsila, does not seem to have caused him or
his followers much distress.
The Educational Sphere
The Kuftariyya has adapted many of
the Naqshbandiyya’s traditional ways and makes use of technology and modern
education tools to adapt to a globalized 20th century context. Accordingly,
the Kuftariyya puts special emphasis on social, economic and political
activities as opposed to the traditional Sufi emphasis on spirituality. The
Kuftariyya has well-established and developing role in the field of education.
The Abu al-Nur Islamic Centre (ANIC),[147] aspires to become an
established and recognized centre for Islamic learning in Syria.[148] The
Abu al-Nur complex extends over an area of 18,000 meters squared and includes a
mosque, library, dorms and conference halls.[149] It houses 7,000-12,000
students from all around the globe and has developed connections with different
universities in Lebanon, Sudan, Pakistan, Egypt and North
America.[150] Students at the foundation are mostly Syrian from various
social strata; their families may be affiliated with the order or not. At the
same time, many international students come to learn religious education and
Arabic at the foundation.[151]
The global aspect of the order plays
an important role in spreading its message and giving it credibility on
worldwide. Abu al-Nur has signed several bilateral treaties with Islamic
centres abroad and opened a branch of ANIC in Baltimore Maryland.[152]There is
a growing presence of foreign diplomats, journalists, researchers, and tourist
at ANIC. The da‘wa department in the organization,
responsible for spreading Islam, is active through the organization’s
international activity. Thus the participation of the Kuftariyya in such
activities has played a significant role in making this movement part of the
global community. The Kuftariyya’s message has taken the form of a global
inter-faith dialogue which makes it depart from propagating a message limited
to Muslims only. As part of Kuftaru’s renewal which takes him away form
Naqshbandi tradition; his sermons included many references to Biblical stories
an he referred to the three monotheistic religions as derivatives of a common
origin.[153] Thus the Kuftariyya tried to addresses all the Abrahamic
faiths, especially the Christian. They do however reflect a continually
modernizing doctrine to fit the surrounding environment. Indeed, through the
preaching of this peaceful, ecumenical interpretation of Islam, the Kuftariyya
has become an influential organization internationally.
The Kuftariyya also provides its
members with a socio-economic network which plays a significant role in the
spread of its message. Like the Gülen Movement, the Kuftariyya stresses the
importance of piety for the individual as well as the need for modern
education. In his lectures, Kuftaru has repeatedly stressed the fact that his
followers could create a modern Muslim community through combining secular and
religious education.[154] The Kuftariyya chooses to
finance modern, professional education such as dentistry, engineering, and
medicine which is designed to create a network of highly educated individuals
who belong to the branch and who will also play a role in influencing the
Syrian society.[155] It may even provide its students the
opportunity to follow ambitious studies abroad.[156] Thus, the Kuftariyya can be
regarded as a social unit providing its followers with a sense of
security. The Kuftariyya also provides direct economic aid to
support poor families in the neighbourhood as a way to strengthen its links
with its followers.[157]
Furthermore, the Kuftariyya uses
modern tools such as the internet to spread its ideas. Ahmad Kuftaru was a leading shaykh in his use of
internet websites[158] to promote his thoughts, and expand his school’s
networks.[159] The educational sphere in the
Kuftariyya thus acts as a channel to spread its message in Syria by providing
its members with a socio-economic community. This sphere as we have seen has
also played a significant role in spreading the Kuftariyya’s message
globally.
Political Ideology and Collaboration
with the State
Although Syria is constitutionally a
parliamentary democracy, politics is practised through informal networks as
parties are virtually non-existent in the Syrian context. Therefore, as an
influential social movement, the Kuftariyya acts as a channel of political and
economic action.[160] Islamic networks’ decision to cooperate, oppose or
coexist with the state regime is dependant on the leader of the network. Ahmad
Kuftaru, and later his son following in the same steps, concluded that the only
solution to safeguarding the Islamic faith is through servile loyalty to the
Ba‘th, despite the sectarian-heterodox provenance of its leaders.[161] The
case of the Kuftariyya is a prime example of a Sufi
network whose leader decided to cooperate with the political authority.
From afar, the Kuftariyya may be seen
as apolitical or controlled by the government. However, Kuftaru’s ecumenical
interpretation of Islam is that of a very talented political figure which was
reflected in Kuftaru’s cooperation with the Alawi regime.[162] In his
double role as Grand Mufti and shaykh of a Sufi order, Kuftaru wielded
political influence. Therefore, while Kuftaru may seem to have been salient and
subservient to the government, his position as the highest religious authority
allowed him to play a significant role in influencing people, especially his
followers. Without Kuftaru, the government would have had more dilemmas in
establishing its authority and passing controversial decisions without causing
the aversion of the Syrian population. Indeed, the regime has relied on the
co-optation of such figures and their support to maintain legitimacy among the
Syrian peoples.[163]
In return, cooperation with the
authoritarian regime facilitates the implementation of certain crucial aspects
of the Kuftariyya’s activity. Through cooperating
with the Asad regime, Kuftaru was awarded a free hand in securing Islamic
education in Syria and preaching a global inter-faith
dialogue.[164] Because Kuftaru and later his son Salah al-Din have been
keen on maintaining a good relationship with the state, the Kuftariyya has
remained to date one of the main providers of Islamic teaching in the
country.[165] While the Naqshbandi tradition has been marked with
consideration of worldly materialism, the extent of the materialistic attitude
adopted by Kuftaru and his followers seems to transcend much further beyond the
innovations of the Naqshbandi tradition. Kuftaru and his followers adopt an
attitude which entails that the material success of their Sufi order is as
important as their spiritual advancement on the path to
God.[166] Cooperation with the state made the expansion of Abu al-Nur
successful; it now contains Islamic schools, four universities and headquarters
for a charitable organization called Ansar.[167] The Naqshbandi tradition
of influencing the government and the elite class of the society is apparent
the Kuftariyya’s practices. A number of the Syrian officials in the Ministry of
Islamic Endowments carry masters and doctoral degrees from
Kuftariyya-affiliated universities.[168] Muhammad Habash, the son in law
of Kuftaru and formerly an influential member in the organization, is a member
of parliament and is a prominent personality in Syrian and global
media.[169] Although Habash was later expelled from the Kuftariyya due his
liberal position on women’s status and inter-faith relations, his example
illustrates the close alliance between the Kuftariyya and the Syrian
authorities.
Nonetheless, the Kuftariyya’s cooperation with the Syrian
regime, has gained it the aversion of the Sunni community. The Kuftariyya’s
cooperation with the state has helped limit the influence of Sunni Islam
(especially the activist Muslim Brotherhood) in Syria. The Kuftariyya
seems to prioritize its agenda above maintaining Sunni ties. This collaboration
resembles the Naqshbandiyya’s cooperation with the Ottoman state in its fight
against the Bektashi order. Yet, the Kuftariyya’s collaboration with a Shi’i
regime departs from the Naqshbandi traditional role in the expanding orthodox
Sunni Islam. Furthermore, Kuftaru’s cooperation with Iranian Shi’a, who
participate in some of ANIC’s activities and attend Friday prayer with the
Kuftariyya members, shows that the Kuftariyya have reinterpreted classical
anti-Shi’i Naqshbandi doctrine.[170] Even if such rapprochement between the
Kuftariyya and the Shi’i Islam is superficial, it reflects the Kuftariyya’s
willingness to compromise Naqshbandi tradition to satisfy the demands of
renewed Sufi agenda.
Chapter 4: The
Muslim Brotherhood
Although the Muslim Brotherhood has been more traditionally associated with the
Salafiyya and an anti-Sufi inclination, the Muslim Brotherhood as delineated by
its founder Hassan al-Banna (d. 1949), shows great affinity towards some forms
of traditional Sufism. Al-Banna defined the movement as ‘a Salafiyya message, a
Sunni way and a Sufi truth, as well as a ‘political organization, an athletic
group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company, and a social idea’.[171] The politically active and
violent history of the brotherhood as well as the criticism of its later
members to Sufism may obscure the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood’s spiritual
ideas and non-political activity were to most members the more important part
of their membership.[172]At the same time, the political passivity
of most Sufi orders in Egypt during the modern era and their non-adherence to
shari‘a, sunna and ‘ilm made it less viable for
al-Banna to fully associate with the Sufi tradition in Egypt. This social
movement is a clear reflection of the intersections between Islam
fundamentalism of a Salafi trend, political activism in its fight against
imperialism and an authoritarian state and Sufism in its emphasis of the
spiritual devotion and development of its members.
The Sufi Truth
Al-Banna the Sufi
The Muslim Brotherhood is significantly older than the other two social
movements under study. While the emphasis on the ideology of Gülen who is still
alive and Kuftaru who only passed away recently may seem reflective of the
movements’ ideologies, a focus on al-Banna’s (who died more than sixty years
ago) ideas may seem less applicable to the contemporary practices of the
movement. It is true that the Muslim Brotherhood has evolved greatly since the
time of al-Banna; however, the ideas of al-Banna remain a fundamental reference
for the Brotherhood. Al-Banna’s ideas and writings form the textual base of the
groups which theoretically directs the Muslim Brothers until today.
Since the early part of his life,
al-Banna was a member of the Hasafiyya Brothers, a sub-branch of the
Shadhiliyya known for its commitment to ‘ilm, shari‘a and sunna. Hassanayn al-Hasafi,
founder of Al-Hasafiyya al-Shadhiliyya was an Azhari scholar, his teachings
were founded upon the principle of ‘ilm and ta‘lim, fiqh, fighting bida‘(innovations) and adherence to shari‘a
and sunna.[173] Al-Banna read avidly on the
founders of the order and on Sufism, becoming an ardent member the dhikr circles and committed to
reciting al-waẓifa al-razukiyya[174] as a disciple of Shaykh
al-Hasafi.[175] Influenced by al-Ghazzali’s
teachings, al-Banna interpreted Sufism as based on activism and involvement in
the world.[176] To him, the path of true Sufism
was sincerity and work in the service of humanity rather than asceticism and
withdrawal from the world.[177] In his memoirs, he explained
that on several occasions his shaykh guided his followers and others to avoid bida‘ and adhere to shari’a.[178] While his Sufi brothers spoke
extensively about the miracles (karamat) of the shaykh, it was the practical
side of the shaykh and not those karamat which founded in al-Banna the
greatest levels of admiration and appreciation for his shaykh.[179] In his memoirs he also
mentioned that: “And if God wills and the power of knowledge of al-Azhar, met
with the spiritual power of the ṭuruq and with the functional power
of the Islamic movements, it would be a nation with no equal”.[180] Indeed, al-Banna tried to
create an all-encompassing movement with social, economic and political
dimensions as well as spiritual and educational ones.
Indoctrination
Al-Banna saw Sufism’s purification of
the self as a method for spiritual pedagogy and the basis of the Muslim
Brotherhood’s message.[181] This is particularly the aspect
of traditional Sufism which al-Banna incorporated into his social movement.
Al-Banna found that the most valuable aspect in Sufism to be ‘ilm al-tarbiyya wa-l-suluk (science of pedagogy and conduct). To
him, this knowledge was vital to organize a special way of life that would take
the individual through the levels of dhikr, ‘ibada (worship) and ma‘rifa (knowledge of God), which are
all stages within a Sufi path.[182] There are many references that
reflect a commitment on the part of al-Banna to learn and teach his followers
in the Sufi path. For example, Said Hawwa mentions in his book, Mudhakkarat fi Manazil al-Siddikin
wa-l-Rabaniyyin: min khilal Nusus wa Hikam Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah al-Sakandari (Treaties on the Ranks of the Righteous
and the Devoted from the Clauses and Wisdoms of Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah
al-Sakandari)[183] - that one of al-Banna’s
companions narrated how al-Banna taught al-ḥikam to a special group of his
students.[184] Today, the books of Said Hawwa,
specifically a series of three books including the one mentioned above, in
addition to Tarbiyatuna al-Rawhiyya (Our Spiritual Pedagogy) and Al-Mustakhlas fi Tazkiyyat al-Anfus
(The Essentials for the Purification of the Self), discuss Sufi spiritual pedagogy.
These books are among the important reference books for the members of the
Muslim Brotherhood today. At the same time, several of the Muslim Brotherhood’s
members have been known Sufi scholars such as Shaykh Tantawi al-Jawhari who was
a prominent personality inside and outside of Egypt during the early 20th century, a professor at Dar
al-‘Ulum in Cairo University known for his great knowledge and intellect, a
committed member of the Brotherhood and a well known Sufi.[185]
According to al-Banna’s teachings, the spiritual development of members takes
on the form of an organized instruction through several methods which form the
basis of al-tarbiyya al-rawḥiyya. Similar to initiation in Sufi
orders, the initiation of members into the Brotherhood is carried out by taking
the ‘oath of the brotherhood’ which is the primary expression of loyalty.[186] Initiation takes place after
the completion of a preliminary spiritual, functional, and educational process
to make the individual ready to enter the brotherhood.[187] The term used to refer to the
taking of the oath or pledging allegiance to the Brotherhood is the same as the
Sufi term bay‘, which also denotes a murid’s initiation into a ṭarīqa. After this step, the member
participates in extensive instruction and spiritual education which to a great
extent resembles the idea of khalwa and suḥba where a murid receives personal spiritual
instruction from the murshid. Because the number of members in the
Brotherhood is much greater than the number of murids in a ṭarīqa, spiritual instruction is not carried
out through direct personal instruction of themurshid.
Spiritual instruction is instead
carried out within smaller groups in a system of families (usar), which was created as an alternative
method of maintaining close relationships among the members despite the growing
number of the group. This method is comparable to the innovation of circles in
the Kuftariyya order. The family (usra) is regarded by the Brotherhood as the
most fundamental of its educational (tarbiyya) tools.[188] The usra which meets weekly, is headed
by a naqib (head), who is delegated an
amount of authority over and responsibility for his members. The member is
prescribed personal, social and financial duties which include among others:
sincere and industrious practice of the rituals of faith.[189] Even more similar to the khalwa tradition, is the katiba system which included personal
spiritual instruction by al-Banna himself during his lifetime. One night a week
or month (frequencies have changed from the time of al-Banna), a group of usar meet for training which
involves a rigorous and sustained night vigil, with a minimum of sleep and a
maximum of common and private prayer and meditation.[190] The katibareflects the exercise of traditional
Sufi practices in its emphasis of meditation, vigils and rigorous training.
Al-Banna used to dedicate a period during the katiba for the explanation of a wird[191] which would revolve around a
specific meaning that al-Banna wanted his followers to internalize.[192] For example, to convey to his
followers the meaning of faith, wird al-imān would be explained, recited and
later memorized and recited regularly by the attendees of the katiba.[193] Likewise, the meanings of
loyalty or sincere devotion would be explained through wird al-wafa’ and wird al-ikhlas respectively. Furthermore, one
of the treaties in Rasai’l al-Imam al-Banna[194] titled, al-Ma’thurat, which refers to a compilation of dhikr[195], awrad (pl wird) andad‘iya (supplications) that are
thought to have been handed down through the Islamic spiritual heritage, for
different occasions and times of the day.[196] Such awrad and dhikr have been documented and they
remain important devotional practices for the members of the Brotherhood.
Therefore, just in Sufi orders, dhikr is emphasized and taught as a
regular ritual which the members should commit to. Through our analysis, it is
apparent that the spiritual dimension of the Brotherhood is closely linked to
Sufi tradition. The Brotherhood’s spirituality however, is less affiliated with
popular 19th Shadhili tradition, which like
most Sufi orders in Egypt illustrated different inclinations as explained
previously.
Social Activism
The Muslim Brotherhood is a mass movement that attracts membership from all
socio-economic classes of the Egyptian society. Al-Banna made public health an
important part of his social reform program as a means to tackle vast national
health problems. The members of the Society were among the first to bring
medical care to the countryside.[197] As a grassroots movement, the
Brotherhood later established educational and healthcare facilities which act
as an alternative to those provided by the state.[198] The Brotherhood’s
social welfare activities are a reflection of its spiritual activist
philosophy. These institutions have enabled the Brotherhood to disperse its
ideology among a large sector of the middle and lower classes of Egyptian
society. At the same time, the Brotherhood includes wealthier members who own
business enterprises help support and fund the organization. In the 1980s, eight
of the eighteen families who dominated Egypt’s private sector, were affiliated
with the Brotherhood.[199] The Brotherhood has also developed a media
network which helps spread the Brotherhood’s ideas and respond to its
criticisms.[200] These roles illustrate that the Muslim Brotherhood has
expanded much farther beyond a mere religious movement. In fact, it is this
expansion into various facets of the Egyptian society, which has kept the
Muslim Brotherhood alive in a modernizing Egyptian context which includes
severe state opposition.
The Brotherhood’s utilization of
modern means of communication to spread its message across a globalizing world
reflects the Society’s collaboration with globalization. The second general
conference[201] held in 1933, was dedicated to the discussion of
advertising and instructional propaganda. The conference members authorized a
small company for the establishment of a press outlet for the
Brotherhood.[202] The Muslim Brotherhood makes extensive use of print and
oral means of communication to spread its message among its own members and the
whole of the Egyptian community. The Brotherhood began publishing a weekly
magazine called Majallat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (the Newspaper of the Muslim
Brothers) in1933.[203] This paper was followed by a political
weekly, al-Nadhir (the Warner) in 1938 and a
daily newspaper called Jaridat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (the Muslim Brothers) in 1946
which exemplify the Brotherhood’s keenness on taking advantage of modern
communication means. The Brotherhood’s use of modern communication means has
also played a vital role in spreading al-Banna’s teachings. A committee was
responsible for collecting, systemizing and republishing a major part of
al-Banna’s written works, especially al-Rasa’il which are a vital reference for the
members of the Brotherhood.[204] Today, the Brotherhood has official
English and Arabic websites which address the global community. These websites
continuously update the Brotherhood’s members and the general Egyptian public
with the organization’s news and opinions on a variety of issues including
politics and education.[205]
It would be beyond the limitations of
this research to expound on each aspect of the Brotherhood’s socio-economic
activism. It is however clear at this point that unlike traditional Sufi orders
which depended on cooperation with the state, it is the Muslim Brotherhood’s
social activism in all facets of life which has contributed to the expansion of
the organization’s influence and membership. Indeed, the Brotherhood’s
educational and socio-economic roles along with its use of modern communication
means have allowed it to become a global movement.
Organizational Structure and Political
Agenda
In terms of organizational structure
and functions, the Muslim Brotherhood illustrates clear departure from the
Shadhili tradition. Al-Banna saw that Sufism transgressed what he defined as
its pure form – dhikr, asceticism, worship, and intuitive
and mystical perception of God – and had become mixed with foreign elements
such as ‘the sciences of philosophy and logic and the heritage and thought of
ancient nations’.[206] He felt that divisions,
corruption and competitiveness among the organized groups had greatly harmed
Sufism in the contemporary world. Thus, al-Banna made no effort to present his
own organization as aṭarīqa.[207] Al-Banna created a highly
organized movement which is guided by regulations that were drafted since his
time and continue to be reviewed by a consultative body and guidance council.
The Muslim Brotherhood in no way resembles the organizational model of a ṭarīqa, instead it is much closer to a modern
company or political party. The Brotherhood is headed by the General/Supreme
Guide (al-murshid al-‘ām), and includes: a consultative
assembly, a guidance council, a deputy, secretariat, committees and both
technical and field subsections.[208] Unlike a ṭarīqa, where the murshid takes on an authoritarian-type
of role, the Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood shares his authority. The Supreme
Guide is directed by three main parts: the Guidance Council, the highest
administrative unit within the organization; the Consultative Assembly, the
general consultative council; and by the Fundamental Law, a collection of
regulations in the form of articles which direct the internal and external
functions of the Brotherhood.[209] The articles within the
Fundamental law are updated through amendments which the Guidance Council votes
on. Unlike the murshid of a ṭarīqa who is not elected and remains
the head until his death, the Fundamental Law requires the council to hold
elections every six years to elect a Supreme Guide. Although this law
theoretically distinguishes the Brotherhood from traditional orders, all murshids of the Muslim Brotherhood
stayed in their position as Supreme Guide until their death except for Muhammad
Mahdi Akef who did not renew his term but instead resigned six-month before its
termination in 2009.[210] It is apparent from such
illustrations in the function of the Brotherhood that its organization is at
least in theory, quite similar to a Western-inspired democratically lead
organization rather than a traditional Sufi order.
Likewise, although some Shadhili
sub-branches have been politically involved during history, the political
involvement of the Brotherhood transcends that of traditional Sufi
orders. Furthermore, when compared to popular Sufi orders in Egypt who
maintained an apolitical or passive approach, the Muslim Brotherhood reflects
intense political activism. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood had a
significant role during Egypt’s fight against imperialism and in the 1947 war
on the Palestinian lands.[211] The Brotherhood’s violent acts
and inclination to oppose instead of cooperate with the state, clearly
distinguishes it from traditional Sufism in Egypt. Yet, when compared to the
Naqshbandiyya, we may see in such actions some parallels between the political
ideology of Brotherhood and traditional Sufism in its fight against imperialism
and secular states. Furthermore, recent developments within the Brotherhood’s
political agenda which include the participation of its members as independent
candidates in elections only after its failed attempts to create a political
party, clarify that the Muslim Brotherhood does not consider itself a social
movement with mere political underpinnings.[212] Instead, the Muslim Brotherhood
has increasingly developed into an organization reminiscent of a political
movement.
Concluding Remarks
The three contemporary social movements – the Gülen
Movement, the Kuftariyya and the Muslim Brotherhood, reflect the way Sufism has
transformed during the 20th century. A common feature shared among the
three social movements is that they have each transformed in form and structure
and transcended the social, economic and political functions of a traditional
Sufi order during the 19th century. Each of these movements has either
abandoned the ṭarīqa formation or relegated it to a secondary
role. The dominance of social, economic, political and educational roles, which
have been suited to each movement’s priorities and national contexts, reflects
the transformation of their spheres of influence.
Because the Naqshbandiyya reflected a unique
ability to adapt continuously to the changes in its environment, the two social
movements linked to it, the Gülen Movement and the Kuftariyya, reflect more
commonalities with traditional Sufism than the similarities we see between the
Shadhiliyya branches and the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, the Muslim
Brotherhood reflects closer affiliation with the Naqshbandiyya than it does
with the Shadhiliyya for two main reasons. For one, traditional Sufism as
exemplified by most Shadhiliyya branches were not as seen as committed to ‘ilm, shari‘a and sunna. Secondly, traditional Sufism
in 19th century Egypt took on a passive, apolitical
role. Because the Naqshbandiyya was generally committed to adhering to shari‘a,
sunna and approaching taṣawwuf through ‘ilm, the mystical aspects of the three social
movements are similar to the Naqshbandi tradition in that sense. At the same
time, the Naqshbandiyya’s activism is also a feature that is fundamental to the
contemporary social movements who have translated this principle into more
defined social, economic, educational and political roles.
The influence of modern forces – secular,
authoritarian states, globalization, a Western-inspired rationalist discourse
and the Salafiyya, is the underlying reason for the transformation of
traditional Sufism in the directions we found. As exemplified in our three
social movements each of them adapted, in varying degrees, to each of these
forces. While some aspects of a traditional Sufi order were eliminated during
this process of acculturation, other aspects were strengthened and developed.
The political role of the Muslim Brotherhood and its relationship with the
state is its most distinguishing feature; it places the Brotherhood apart from
the other two movements who do not assume a clear political role and choose to
either cooperate (the Gülen Movement) or create an alliance (the Kuftariyya)
with the state. This political role also links the Brotherhood more deeply than
its contemporaries with the revolutionary character of the Naqshbandiyya.
Another point that became apparent through our
research is the convergence between activism and asceticism, politics and
spirituality and fundamentalism and mysticism within the traditional context
and even more so in the modern context of the Islamic World. Each of our social
movements represented an example of the combination of commonly presumed
incompatible trends. The Gülen Movement, the Kuftariyya and the Muslim
Brotherhood are clear examples of a union between activism and asceticism. They
each have a spiritual and political role. At the same time, each movement is to
some extent or other, a reflection of the links between Sufism and the
fundamentalist Salafiyya.
The three social movements have illustrated a
revolution in their means of communication and methods of expansion. The global
context has offered each the social movements modern means of communication and
the ability to disperse their ideas globally through media networks, the
establishment of educational institutions and the expansion their social,
economic and political functions beyond their national borders. Modernity has
thus been an opportunity and not just a challenge for these movements. At the
same time however, modernity threatens to erase the remaining aspects of
traditional Sufism within the contemporary movements. As their non-spiritual
roles may potentially become even more central to the movements, the
significance of the spiritual dimension is likely to diminish. Furthermore,
modernity may continue to transform the very nature of the various faculties
and characteristics (spiritual and non-spiritual) of the social movements which
link them to traditional Sufism.
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[10] Quintan
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Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood and State Power in Jordan (New York 2001), 8.
[14] Itzchak
Weismann, The
Naqshbandiyya: Orthodoxy and Activism in a Worldwide Sufi Tradition (New
York 2007), 3.
[15] Hakan
Yavuz, ‘The Matrix of Modern Turkish Islamic Movements: The Naqshbandi Sufi
Order’, in Elisabeth Özdalga (ed), Naqshbandis in Western
and Central Asia (Istanbul
1999), 130.
[16] Michael
Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi
in Modern Egypt: An Essay in the Sociology of Religion (Oxford
1973), 4.
[47] Ibn
‘Arabi (1165–1240) is a well-known philosopher and mystic. His ideas have been
considered controversial throughout the Muslim world.
[48] Abu
Hamid al-Ghazzali (1058-1111) is a famous jurist, theologian and Sufi of the
12th century. He wrote on a wide range of topics including jurisprudence,
theology, mysticism and philosophy.
[55] Tomas
Gerholm, ‘The Islamization of Contemporary Egypt’ in E.E. Rosander and D.
Westerlund (eds), African
Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists (London
1997), 139-140.
[57] Richard
J.A. McGregor, ‘A Study of Sainthood in Medieval Islamic Egypt: Muhammad and
‘Ali Wafa’, McGill University (Montreal 2001), 41.
[58] Frederick
De Jong, Turuq
and Turuq Linked Institutions in Nineteenth Century Egypt (Leiden
1978), 32.
[60] Frederick
De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Egypt during the ‘Urabi Insurrection and the
British Occupation (1882-1914): Some Societal Factors Generating Aloofness,
Support, and Opposition’, Journal
of the American Research Center in Egypt 21 (1984), 132.
[64] The
‘Urabi Insurrection is also known as the ‘Urabi
Revolution, was an uprising in Egypt in 1879-82 against the Khedive and European influence in the country. It
was led by and named after Colonel Ahmed Urabi.
[69] De
Jong, ‘Al-Mashayikh al-Bakriyya and the Transformation of their Authority in 19th Century
Egypt’ in Sufi
Orders in Ottoman and Post Egypt and the Middle East:
Collected Studies, 84.
[72] Frederick
De Jong, ‘Turuq and Turuq-Opposition in 20th Century
Egypt’ in Sufi Orders in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Egypt and the Middle East,
186 and Gerholm, 140.
[74] Muhammad
Rashid Rida (d.1935) who is associated with the consolidation of the modern
Salafiyya, followed a Naqshbandi order during his early years. He became
dismayed by certain Sufi practices such as dance and singing during dhikr. His
criticisms intensified when he came under the influence of ‘Abduh.
Itzchak Weismann, The
Naqshbandiyya: Orthodoxy and activism in a Worldwide Sufi Tradition
(New York 2007), 144.
[77] A mawlid is
theoretically defined as the day of birth of a saint. But in practice the mawlid celebrations
are general days of commemoration during which several rituals are carried out
including dhikr and
other elements that may accompany it such as dance and music, depending on the
practices of the order.
[81] During
a mawlid and
other congregations, men and women crowd around saints’ tombs and try to touch
them so that they can acquire some of the saint’s baraka.
[82] Menemen
Rebellion refers to a chain of incidents which occurred in the town of Menemen in Turkey, on 23 December 1930. In response
to the state’s promotion of secularism, a member of the Naqshbandi order led a crowd against the secular
government and called for the restoration of Islamic rule and the Caliphate.
[89] Rumi
also known as Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Rumi (1207 –1273), was a
13th-century Persian poet, jurist, theologian, and Sufi mystic.
[90] Thomas
Michel, ‘Sufism and Modernity in the Thought of Fethullah Gülen’, The Muslim World 95:3
(2005), 354.
[92] Elisabeth
Özdalga, ‘Worldly Asceticism in Islamic Casting: Fethullah Gülen’s Inspired
Piety and Activism’, Middle
East Critique 9:17
(2000), 92.
[94] Nil
Publications is a publishing house owned by Gülen’s followers. This company has
translated and printed famous works for Gülen and Nursi. The publishing house
sells Arabic translations of such works at a bookstore called Dar al-Nile
located in Cairo. This bookstore is only one among others located
internationally including the U.S. www.daralnile.com
[95] Ahmad
Sirhindi (1564–1624)
was an Indian Islamic scholar and a prominent member of
the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufi order.
[96] Sidney
Griffith, ‘Fethullah Gülen and
the ‘People of the Book’: A Voice from Turkey for Interfaith Dialogue’, The
Muslim World 95:3
(2005), 331.
[100] Fethullah
Gülen, [Kalbin Zümrüt
Tepeleri] Emerald Hills of the Heart Trans.
Ali Ünal (New Jersey 2006), xiii.
[106] Fethullah Gülen, [Ölçü veya Yoldaki Işıklar] Al-Mawazin
aw ’Adwa’ ‘ala al-Tariq (Pillars
or Lights on the Road) Trans.
Orhan Muhammad Ali (Istanbul 2006), 9-12.
[118] Lester
R. Kurtz, ‘Gülen’s
Paradox: Combining Commitment and Tolerance’, The Muslim World 95:3 (2005),
381.
[121] Examples
of these websites in English, Arabic and Turkish are: www.fethullahgulen.org, http://ar.fgulen.com, http://fgulenkitap.com.
[124] ‘An
Interview with Fethullah Gülen’ Trans. Zeki Saritoprak and Ali
Ünal, The
Muslim World 95:3
(2005), 455.
[127] http://fethullahgulen.org/press-room/news/720-leading-turkish-islamic-figure-meets-pontiff-in-the-vatican.html
[128] It is interesting to note that the
same message is preached by the fundamentalist Islamists today. This shows the
commonalities between Sufism and fundamentalist Islam.
[129] Thomas
Pierret, ‘Sunni Clergy Politics in the Cities of Ba’thi Syria’ in Fred H.
Lawson (ed) Demystifying
Syria (London
2009), 72.
[130] Paulo
G. Pinto, [‘Le Soufisme En Syrie’] ‘Sufism in Syria’ in Baudouin Dupret,
Zouhair Gazzal, Youssef Courbage, et al. (eds) [La Syrie au
présent: reflet d’une société] Present-Day Syria : Reflections of a Society (Paris 2007), 391.
[131] Paulo
G. Pinto, ‘The Limits of the Public: Sufism and the Religious Debate in Syria’,
in Armando Salvatore and Dale Eickelman (eds) Public Islam and the Common Good (Boston
2004), 192.
[132] Leif
Stenberg, [‘Islamisation d’un quartier: l’heritage du cheikh Ahmad Kuftaro‘]
‘Islamization of a Neighbourhood: The Legacy of Shaykh Ahmad Kuftaru’ in
Baudouin Dupret, Zouhair Gazzal, Youssef Courbage, et al. (eds) [La Syrie au présent: reflet d’une société] Present-Day Syria: Reflections of a Society (Paris 2007), 371.
[134] Leif
Stenberg, ‘Naqshbandiyya in Damascus: Strategies to Establish and Strengthen
the Order in a Changing Society’ in Elisabeth Özdalga (ed) Naqshbandis
in Western and Central Asia: Change and Continuity (Istanbul
1999), 106.
[139] It is important to note that this
specific term, tazkiyya is a widely discussed subject in the
Muslim world as we later explain in reference to Said Hawwa, a Syrian member of
the Muslim Brotherhood who has written extensively in the field of Sufism. He
represents an example of the convergence of the Salafi trend and Sufism.
[159] Andreas
Christmann, [‘Les cheikhs syriens et internet’] ‘Syrian Shaykhs and the
Internet’ in Baudouin Dupret, Zouhair Gazzal, Youssef Courbage, et al. (eds) [La Syrie au présent: reflet d’une société] Present-Day Syria: Reflections of a Society (Paris 2007), 422.
[163] Salwa Ismail,
‘Changing Social Structure, Shifting Alliances and Authoritarianism in Syria in
Fred H. Lawson (ed) Demystifying Syria (London 2009), 25.
[174] A waẓifa is a collection of dhikr compiled
by the shaykh and given to the followers so that they can recite it during
certain times of the day. For example, al-Banna mentions that he recited this dhikr every
morning and evening.
[181] Mahmud ‘Abd al-Halim, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun: Ahdath Sana‘at al-Tarikh (The Muslim Brotherhood: Incidents that Made History) (Cairo 1978), 136.
This book is the first part of a series
written as an insiders view on the Muslim Brotherhood. The author of the book
is the son of Shaykh ‘Abd al-Halim Mahmud, the famous Azhari-Sufi scholar.
[183] Also
known as Al-Hikam
al-‘Ata’iyya, it is a well known Sufi reference.
Its author, Ibn ‘Ata’ Allah al-Sakandari was a scholar and founder of the
Shadhiliyya who lived during the 14thcentury
as mentioned earlier.
[187] Hassan
al-Banna , ‘Risalat
al-Ta’lim’ in Majmu‘at
Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid Hassan al-Banna (Cairo 2002), 372- 385.
[191] A wird is a
section of the Qur’an which is recited during a specified time of day or night
devoted to private worship (in addition the five daily prayers) in J. Milton
Cowan (ed) Hans
Wehr: A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (Beirut 198), 1061.
The repitition of this wird is a
form of performing dhikr,
which is a main Sufi ritual in Paulo Pinto ‘Sufism and the Religious Debate in
Syria’, 195.
[194] Majmu‘at
Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid Hassan al-Banna (The
Collection of the Treaties of the Martyr, the Imam Hassan al-Banna) is
a compilation of al-Banna’s 13 treaties (rasa’il)
which he wrote as a collection of the fundamentals of the Brotherhood. Also
known as al-Rasa’il (The Treaties) includes the discussion of Brotherhood’s
philosophy, relations with the state, an economic program, women and education.
The Treaties are a fundamental reference for the Brotherhood until today.
[195] It
is interesting to note that just like the dhikr of the Hasafiyya Shadhiliyya, the daily
morning and evening dhikr assigned
by al-Banna to his followers, is also called al-waẓifa.
[198] Jaine
A. Clark, Islam,
Charity and Activism: Middle-Class Networks ans Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen (Indiana
2004), 5.
[199] Joel
Beinin, ‘Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of
Islamist Social Movements in Egypt and Turkey’ Conference Papers on French and
US Approaches to Understanding Islam (2004), 12.
[201] A
series of ‘general conferences’ were called periodically to discuss and plan
action or to ratify previous decisions. These conferences played an important
role in the growth of the Society during the 1930s.
[210] Dina
Basiony (May 2009), Egypt Today: The Magazine of Egypt, http://www.egypttoday.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=8487
[212] Noha
Antar, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood’s Success in the Legislative Elections in Egypt
2005: Reasons and Implications’ (2005). Euro-Mediterranean
Study Commission EuroMesco 2006. http://www.ikhwanweb.com/uploads/lib/3Z77D9TTFPH5FGH.pdf
