Portrait of Fethullah Gülen: A Modern Turkish-Islamic
Reformist
Bekim
Agai
Fethullah
Gülen, founder of a worldwide Islamic education movement, regards morality and
education as the engine for a contemporary Islam that is compatible with
laicism.
Many
are on the lookout today for “reformist thought” in the Islamic world. The
question here is what qualities an Islamic reformist is expected to demonstrate
and what exactly makes for “Islamic reformist thinking.”
On
the one hand, there are Muslims who refer to themselves as Islamic reformers
(e.g. as “Euro Muslims”), but of whom few Muslims take much note. And on the
other hand, there are those who are described as such, but themselves say that
they are not out to reform Islam, but rather only to interpret it in an
“Islamically correct” manner.
This
second group of Islamic thinkers includes Fethullah Gülen, the spiritual father
of what has been probably the most active Turkish-Islamic movement of the late
20th century. To date, far too little attention has been devoted to Gülen and
his followers in analyses of recent Islamic thought in Turkey.
The
following observations are based largely on my analysis of the ideas of
Fethullah Gülen, their dissemination, and the way in which his devotees are
organized. I will describe how Fethullah Gülen’s discourse on education is
reflected in the extremely flexible organizational network of his followers.
We
will examine both Fethullah Gülen himself as well as the broader question of
whether we might not often be looking in the wrong places for the reformers
within the Islamic spectrum.
Fethullah
Gülen as “Model Muslim”
Fethullah
Gülen is a retired preacher who was born in 1938 in a village near Erzurum in
eastern Anatolia and today lives in the USA. During the 70s and 80s he traveled
as a state preacher all over Turkey, at that time already accumulating a broad
following.
One
of the key approaches in the ideas he has developed through the years is the
attempt to shape a more modern Islam by applying knowledge borrowed from the
natural sciences.
In
the face of the growing influence of Islamic tendencies on Turkey’s political
landscape during the 90s, the moderate/conservative parties in particular
styled Gülen as a “model Muslim” who offered a synthesis of Islamic values with
the separation of Islam and politics demanded by Kemalism.
In
1999, however, he himself became the victim of a state campaign that labeled
him an Islamic menace, although these accusations have meanwhile died down.
Fethullah Gülen lives today in the USA.
Gülen’s
education network
Fethullah
Gülen is the founder of an Islamic educational movement, which during the past
30 years has set up a network of schools in Turkey and elsewhere, but in the
day-to-day operation of which he is not directly involved.
Motivated
by Islamic principles, his adherents are committed to modern, “non-religious”
education and are active in building private, state-certified educational
facilities without a central focus on religious subjects.
English
is usually the primary language of instruction. These schools are today
represented all over the world, the result of a view of Islam that developed
from the secular Turkish context in conservative Islamic circles.
This
attitude toward Islam is not a component of the modern reformist Islam
proclaimed by the Turkish state and taught at the theological universities; to
some extent it even came about in opposition to the official state
understanding of Islam.
The
concentration of activities on “non-religious” educational work is all the more
astounding when one considers that it is precisely the laicistic Turkish state
that tends to regard foreign cultural policy, for example in Central Asia, but
in Germany as well, as a matter of religious works, such as building mosques or
supporting religious educational institutions.
The
traditional understanding of Islam
Fethullah
Gülen is well known to the Turkish public for his activities in the
inter-religious realm, his standing on the reconcilability of Islam and
laicism, his public condemnation of violence in the name of Islam, and above
all for his stance on the significance of education in Islam.
Delving
into his extensive writings, however, one soon realizes that Fethullah Gülen is
not interested in advocating his own unique theology or even a revolutionary
new direction. His understanding of Islam is oriented along the conservative
mainstream and his arguments are traditional – and yet the activities of his
followers still manage to amaze every observer.
Since
the 80s, they have built some 150 private schools, 150 dersanes (centers that
prepare students for their university entrance exam), and numerous student
dormitories.
Fethullah
Gülen’s education discourse is disseminated chiefly through a media network set
up in the 80s, encompassing a news agency, a television station, a daily paper,
and several magazines and publishers.
These
media all report on the activities of Gülen’s adherents. The facilities set up
by the group are formally independent of one another; however, they are joined
together into an educational network by virtue of the close contacts maintained
by their directors.
Educational
concepts with worldwide success
After
the fall of the “Iron Curtain,” Fethullah Gülen encouraged his followers to
spread his ideas beyond Turkey’s borders. He could count on receiving support
from businesspeople who had expressed interest in backing his ideas abroad.
Special
emphasis was placed on the countries in the former Soviet Union and the
Balkans. Gülen’s adherents also set up educational facilities that are not
affiliated with the Turkish Ministry of Education in China, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Yakutia (Russ. Fed.), Cambodia, the
Netherlands, France, the Philippines, South Korea, Tanzania, Chechnya (Russ.
Fed.), and Thailand.
An
obvious omission are the Arab states: the involvement of Turks here in such a
central area as the educational system is apparently unthinkable. In Germany
the movement is very active, with tutoring centers in nearly every major city
and private schools planned. Although the group has no official headquarters in
Germany, this does not mean that its activities are not coordinated in a
network.
This
represents the first time an Islamic group has exerted this kind of influence
on the secular educational system in modern Turkey, and the first time an
educational concept from Turkey has been successfully exported abroad.
No
wonder opinion is so strongly divided in Turkey with regard to Gülen and his
followers – after all, they have managed to flout the boundaries between
“Islamic” and “secular” areas of society that have been firmly entrenched there
for so long.
Although
the educational institutions stem from an Islamic concept, they are recognized
by the laicistic Turkish state. They are incorporated into the – almost always
secular – national educational systems in the various countries and the
language of instruction is usually English.
In
Turkey the general curriculum for the schools within the network prescribes one
week of religious instruction per week, while in many other countries the
schools do not offer any religious education at all. These schools (with the
exception of some Imam Hatip schools) can thus hardly be considered Islamic
schools in the strict sense.
Gülen’s
Islamic concepts – the “Gülen discourse”
This
commitment to education, Gülen’s own attitude toward Islam and politics, as
well as the positions of the media within his network manifest new impulses
originating in Turkey’s Islamic milieu.
We
are seeing many positive ripple effects arising from Gülen’s set of values and
the activities of his followers. But does that make him an Islamic reformer? In
order to answer this question, we first have to take a closer look at the world
of ideas propagated by Fethullah Gülen.
A
distinction must be made between reformist theology and innovative Islamic
thinking. The “Gülen discourse” consists of numerous elements that can only be
touched on briefly here. One feature of this discourse is the ambiguity of his
statements, the way in which his ideas are “packaged” in different ways
depending on the audience.
Here,
his achievement is not to be found in the reinterpretation of religious texts,
but rather in the way in which he recombines various generally acknowledged
elements into new theses. The basic principles of this discourse are:
Preservation
of Islam in the modern age
1.
This tenet is based on the ideas of the Turkish activist Said Nursi (d. 1960).
His view of Islam was shaped by several basic assumptions:
-
The modern secular state is a powerful opponent. Direct confrontation can only
harm one’s own Islamic interests, since the state will inevitably respond with
repression. It is clear for Nursi that God judges each individual separately
for how he leads his own life. An Islamic reform movement would thus need to
concentrate on guiding individuals along the right path; the state order must
be accepted as the framework for one’s own dealings, in order to devote
attention to more important tasks.
-
Man is living in an age of science and technology, for which there is no
alternative. Either one helps to shape one’s age in a religious way, or one
forfeits the power to exert any influence at all. Fethullah Gülen elaborates on
this point with the remark: “The dissatisfied have never shaped history.” He
thus disavows a revolutionary approach. He counters the idea of a retreat from
secular society with active engagement (as a contribution to social reform).
-
Nursi and Gülen view modern science as a means for attempting to rationally
comprehend God by studying His creation. This is therefore the only way to
preserve religion in the modern age. This concept endows the rational study of
the world, the foundation of which is provided by the secular school, with a
religious significance. Science likewise forms the basis for economic
prosperity, social harmony, and national independence: all goals necessary for
the survival of both the modern state and modern Islam.
-
Theological debates have no place in an era in which the very continued
existence of religion is at risk. Theology should thus emphasize those areas in
which there is consensus and gloss over the more detailed issues.
Turkish
nationalism and Islam
2.
A crucial factor in Fethullah Gülen’s ascendance in Turkey is the synthesis of
Turkish nationalism and Islam for which he stands. This has been adopted by his
adherents in other countries as well, with the nationalism principle expanded
to suit local conditions.
Gülen
and his followers view the world of nation-states as just as much of a given as
globalization. They no longer believe (although this was a different story for
Gülen in the 80s) that their own Islamic identity can be preserved by cutting
themselves off from the outside world.
Gülen
is confident that his views can be realized and therefore advocates open
borders, in order to regain validity for Islam. Since there is no way to halt
globalization, it must instead be harnessed as an opportunity.
In
his opinion, theology is not the key to shaping the modern world, but rather
secular educational institutions, along with the targeted use of (modern)
media, and participation and influence in the business world.
Gülen
sees the obligations Islam places on its followers as being very clearly
defined, and in this respect he is well within the conservative consensus.
However, Muslims must continue to pursue further knowledge in order to cast off
both their material and ideological dependency on the West (with its
materialistic, positivistic orientation). This dependency is just as much the
focus of Fethullah Gülen’s critique as is political Islam.
National
and cultural independence can only be preserved if the Muslims succeed in
shaping the modern world in accordance with their own beliefs rather than
rejecting modernity out of hand.
Morality
and education before politics
3.
In accordance with these views, Fethullah Gülen’s sermons are not theologically
innovative. He preaches classic Islamic behavioral maxims: cihad (jihad = “exertion”
on the path to God), irşad (“guidance”), tebliğ (“dissemination” of Islam), and
above all hizmet (peaceful “service” in God’s name). He substantiates these
using theologically well established argument patterns.
Conspicuous
here is how conventional his reasoning is when it comes to persuading listeners
of what is right according to Islam, while at the same time he proposes
entirely new ways of implementing these convictions. The schoolteacher here
becomes a prophet, who fulfills the above-named Islamic principles by imparting
knowledge.
The
key point for Gülen is that the Islamic principles are themselves unchanging,
and yet must be given concrete form in each new era. Once, a Koran course might
have been the best way to invest Islamic donations. But in times in which
“there is a mosque on every corner,” other Islamic activities take precedence,
according to Gülen and his devotees.
He
succeeds at gaining power in conservative Islamic circles for new Islamic
fields of action, using traditional Islamic terminology and defining his terms
absolutely conventionally, but at the same time furnishing them with extremely
innovative implications for the present day.
Gülen’s
strategy for circumventing critical objections, or contradictions between
Islamic and secular law or Islamic concepts of state, does not involve taking
recourse to Turkish, Iranian, or Arab reformist scholars, who reinterpret
history and the Koran.
Instead,
he simply argues that questions of morality and education are more essential for
today’s Islam than are political issues, and that present-day Muslims are
confronted with entirely different problems than the question of whether or not
to introduce the Sharia.
4.
Gülen has developed an ethic of good works that both opens up new fields of
society for Islamic activities and elevates work and efficiency to maxims to
live by. In this context, work dedicated to reaching an Islamic goal (even if
only a portion of the earnings are donated to the cause) becomes an act in the
service of God. Educational work and support of education in particular are
endowed with the highest Islamic value.
5.
The vision of how to best implement the Islamic maxims organizationally is
driven by the attempt to avoid frictional losses or inefficiency at all costs.
Inefficiency
thus takes on a reprehensible flavor within Islam. In addition, strategies are
prescribed for how the believer can best fulfill his duties toward God. These
strategies revolve around the efficient implementation of Islamic undertakings,
concrete projects, and individual piety.
Gülen
first and foremost propagates the forms of organization espoused by his own
adherents (the cemaat) as the tool that can help us today to tie individual
salvation to the concerns and goals of the group and of all of society.
He
thus “Islamicizes” the organizational forms of his followers and their
strategies. Both must be flexible, so that as many people as possible can
contribute to realizing the goals of the cemaat. For Gülen, a society can only
be changed through its individuals. The cemaat are dedicated to educating this
“new generation.”
“Islamicized”
pragmatism
6.
Fethullah Gülen and his religious following pursue a very classic
interpretation of Islam. In dealing with others, however, it is more important
to them to convey at least a portion of their own values (even if they must
keep their Islamic motivation in the background), than to come on too strongly
and be too openly Islamic, and thus forfeit any influence beyond Islamic
circles.
Decisive
for the success of Gülen’s ideas is this combination of conventional and
conservative arguments couched in new methods of implementation that allow them
to reach new target groups.
During
my field research, someone with close contact to the cemaat told me the
following: Where he came from, most people, with their traditional Islamic
value system, would have refused just a generation ago to send their own
daughters to a secondary school.
But
nowadays they were even letting their daughters study at university, convinced
as they were of the close connections between Islam and education. This was
only achievable through the use of widely accepted traditional lines of
argumentation.
People
can readily identify with Gülen’s Islamic scope of argumentation. He has
succeeded in interesting people in his goals who could not be moved through the
state-propagated reformist Islam to change their attitudes, but who were ready
instead to put the more individual daily questions of how to raise their
children and how to practice their religion before the broader issues of
political Islam.
This
sheds new light on the question of what reformist Islam consists of. Is it
Islam that needs to be reformed, or do we have to change people instead?
Fethullah Gülen shows that, when analyzing innovative processes in the Islamic
world, we must not neglect the latter approach, even though his ideas cannot be
termed reform theology in the narrower sense.
Translation
from German: Jennifer Taylor-Gaida
Bekim
Agai, PhD, born in 1974, has studied Islamic studies, science of history and
psychology at Bonn and Cairo. Since 2003 he has been working as an assistant
lecturer at the department of orientalistic studies at the University of Bonn.
