Strategy
in the Contemporary World
Strategy
in the Contemporary World looks at the development of strategy, considering the
role of military power in the contemporary world, and assessing the future of
strategy in light of fast-paced technological change. The fourth edition looks
at issues from both times of war and of peace, analysing both conflicts
themselves, and the on-going debates about what can be learned from them. A new
chapter on cyberpower reflects growing debates about whether there has
been a revolution in military affairs and the future of warfare given the
phenomenal pace of innovation in electronics and computer systems, while there
is also a new focus on the strategic implications of a changing world order.
The new edition also includes more material on the transition from war to
peace, and looks at arms control and deterrence, considering in particular the
growing tension between Iran and the West over its nuclear weapons programme.
The new edition sees substantial updating throughout, prefaced by a rewritten
introduction, and provides a comprehensive and insightful collection of
contributions from a team of leading experts in the field. The book is
accompanied by an Online Resource Centre providing additional resources for
both students and lecturers. Student resources: Additional case studies
including the Iran-Iraq war and the 2006 war in Lebanon Web links Lecturer
resources: PowerPoint slides
Table of Contents
Introduction ; PART I: ENDURING ISSUES OF STRATEGY
; 1. The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace ; 2. The Evolution of Modern
Warfare ; 3. Strategic Theory ; 4. Strategic Culture ; 5. Law, Politics,
and the Use of Force ; 6. Geography and Strategy ; 7. Technology and Warfare ;
8. Intelligence and Strategy ; PART II: CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS ; 9.
Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency ; 10. The Second Nuclear Age:
Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century ; 11. The Control of Weapons of
Mass Destruction ; 12. Conventional Power and Contemporary Warfare ; 13. Iraq,
Afganistan and American Military Transformation ; 14. Homeland Security: A New
Strategic Paradigm? ; 15. Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations ; 16. The
Rise of Cyberpower ; PART III: THE FUTURE OF STRATEGY ; 17. A New Agenda
for Security and Strategy? ; 18. Strategic Studies and its Critics ; 19. The
Practice of Strategy ; 20. Does Strategic Studies have a Future?
About the Author
John Baylis is Emeritus Professor of Politics and International Relations and former Pro-Vice Chancellor at Swansea University. He is coauthor of Introduction to Global Politics, Second Edition, (OUP, 2012) and coeditor of The Globalization of World Politics, Fifth Edition (OUP, 2011).
James J. Wirtz is Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He is coeditor of Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats (2012).
Colin S. Gray is Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading. He is the author of Airpower for Strategic Effect (2012) and The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (OUP, 2011).
The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice is an original contribution
to the general theory of strategy. While heavily indebted to Carl von
Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and the very few other classic authors, this book presents
the theory, rather than merely comments on the theory as developed by others.
The author explains that the purpose of strategy is to connect purposefully
politics and policy with the instruments they must use. The primary focus of
attention is on military strategy, but this focus is well nested in discussion
of grand strategy, for which military strategy is only one strand. The book
presents the general theory of strategy comprehensively and explains the
utility of this general theory for the particular strategies that strategists
need to develop in order to meet their historically unique challenges. The book
argues that strategy's general theory provides essential education for
practicing strategists at all times and in all circumstances.
As general theory, The Strategy
Bridge is as relevant to understanding strategic behaviour in the Peloponnesian
War as it is for the conflicts of the twenty-first century. The book proceeds
from exposition of general strategic theory, to address three basic issue areas
that are not at all well explained, let alone understood with a view to
advancing better practice, in the extant literature. Specifically, the book
tackles the problems that harass and imperil strategic performance; it probes
deeply into the hugely underexamined subject of just what it is that the
strategist produces-strategic effect; and it 'joins up the dots' from theory
through practice to consequences by means of a close examination of command
performance. The author takes a holistic view of strategy, and it is rigorously
attentive to the significance of the contexts within which and for which
strategies are developed and applied. The book regards the strategist as a
hero, charged with the feasible, but awesomely difficult, task of converting the
threat and use of force (for military strategy) into desired political
consequences. He seeks some control over the rival or enemy via strategic
effect, the instrumental produce of his instrumental labours. In order to
maximise his prospects for success, the practicing strategist requires all the
educational assistance that strategic theory can provide.
